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Meaning, Reference, and Reification in
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Williamson B.C. Chang*
Among the most critical problems in securities regulation is determin-
ing what constitutes a "security." The Supreme Court has never posi-
tively identified the essential features of a security. If the Court ever ar-
rives at a comprehensive definition, its decision will affect many
corporations and major economic transactions. In this Article, Professor
Chang develops a comprehensive, yet relatively simple model that defines
security for the purposes of federal regulation and reconciles the Court's
major securities decisions. The Article also provides insight into the use
of language, describes the implications of "open-ended" legislative intent,
and offers a framework with which to view the dialectic process of com-
mon lawmaking as a consistent evolution of standards.
INTRODUCTION
In securities regulation, the sections defining a "security" in both the
1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act' are impor-
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I The definitions of a security in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 are substantially the same. "[The Supreme Court has consistently
held that the definition of security under the two acts is essentially the same." Daily v.
Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 555 n.3. (1982)). Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(1982), defines a security as follows:
(1) the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guar-
antee for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
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tant chokepoints that allow or deny a claimant access to the panoply of
important federal remedies.2 The application of the securities acts has
significant consequences for litigants who otherwise would be relegated
to state law. Thus a firm and predictable definition of the term "secur-
ity" would seem axiomatic to the fair and smooth operation of the se-
curities acts. Yet, the provisions defining security have been uncertain,
beset by the use of catch-all phrases and bogged down in the quagmire
of contextual qualifiers that fail to define clearly the circumstances ex-
empting certain transactions from securities regulation.'
Most cases interpreting these definitional sections have relied on the
legislative history, policies, and purposes of the securities acts for guid-
ance.4 This Article suggests that other linguistic and jurisprudential
foregoing.
Explicit and implied causes of action for misrepresentation in transactions involv-
ing securities are contained in the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12 & 17, 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 1 & q (1982), and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10, 14, 16 & 18, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j, n, p & r (1982). Moreover, the 1933 Act requires registration of offers
and sales of securities in § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, subject to various exemptions as speci-
fied in §§ 3 & 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c & d (1982).
' A variety of instruments, schemes, and arrangements raise the issue of whether a
security is involved. As Professor Hazen has stated: "What do the following have in
common: scotch whiskey, self-improvement courses, cosmetics, earthworms, beavers,
muskrats, rabbits, chinchillas, fishing boats, vacuum cleaners, cemetery lots, and fruit
trees? The answer is that they have all been held to be securities within the meaning of
federal or state securities statutes." T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
14 (1985) (footnotes omitted). It is the manner in which the above items are packaged
and sold, and not the items themselves, that invites characterization as a security. Nev-
ertheless, the broad range of items that raise the issue evidences interpretive problems
and the expansive nature of the definition. The development of the sale of business
doctrine (under which a stock purchase was not deemed the purchase of a security if
control of the corporation changed hands during the transaction) is the clearest example
of the clash between the notion that the definition of security is modified by the quali-
fying prefatory phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" (signaled by the catch-
all phrase, "investment contract") and the strong sense that certain instruments, such as
stock, represent the paradigm of a security. Until the Supreme Court rejected the sale
of business doctrine in Landreth v. Landreth Timber Co., 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985), and
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985), the circuits were divided on the applica-
bility of the sale of business doctrine. Compare Daily, 701 F.2d 496 and Golden v.
Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) with Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669 (10th
Cir. 1983) and Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982). In Landreth, the Court
acknowledged the ambiguity in defining a security: "It is fair to say that our cases have
not been entirely clear on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a 'security.'" Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2303.
The Supreme Court's rationale for deciding that the sale of business doctrine was'
not a valid interpretation of the term "security" typically relied on statutory language
and congressional purpose. "It is axiomatic that '[tihe starting point in every case in-
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concerns must be addressed, such as the problem of self-referencing def-
initions,' the need to preserve the reified nature of instruments in the
commercial world,6 and the possibility that the concept of a security
may be both referential and attributive.' This Article suggests a two-
tiered model of these definitional sections.8 The two-tiered model pro-
volving construction of a statute is the language itself.'" Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2301
(citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)). "Reading
the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at issue here comports with Congress'
remedial purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors . . . ." Landreth, 105
S. Ct. at 2303.
" See infra text accompanying notes 91-118. This part of the Article argues that
avoiding the tendency to define the term security by reference to the policies of the Acts
best preserves fairness to the parties. The notion that the concept of a security is inde-
pendent of a judge's determination that the securities acts are applicable allows parties
to ascertain whether their conduct must comply with the securities laws at the time of
the transaction.
' See infra text accompanying notes 119-73. This part argues that stocks, bonds,
notes, and even investment contracts should represent the names for classes of instru-
ments created by state law sources. In other words, in the first level of analysis courts
should determine whether an instrument is a stock or bond by reference to generalized
state law conceptions that describe the inherent characteristics of such instruments.
" See infra text accompanying notes 69-90. This Article argues that the Acts' sec-
tions defining a security are both referential and attributive. One component of the
definition refers to state-created instruments (stocks, bonds, notes, and the like). The
attributive component of the definition operates as an open-textured term (like "due
process") that excludes some of these instruments because the context of the transaction
would so require.
a See infra text accompanying notes 84-90. The two-tiered approach suggests that
there are two levels. For an instrument to qualify as a security it must first fit within
one of the categories specifically mentioned in the definitional section, such as stock,
notes, bonds, and debentures. An investment contract is considered an instrument. All
of these first level categories are defined by reference to a generalized state law concep-
tion of the term. If an instrument falls within one of these categories then it may be
exempted from the term "security" if contextual or policy reasons would justify exclu-
sion. For example, if the court were considering whether or not certificates of deposit
(CD's) issued by a bank were securities it would first determine whether the CD's fit
the state law descriptions of notes, investment contracts, or inter alia, evidence of a
long-term indebtedness. If the CD's met this test, the court then would determine
whether the circumstances of the particular transaction or the policy and purposes of
the securities acts would not merit applicability of the securities law. This Article pro-
poses a two-tiered test in lieu of present one-tier analysis, which requires an instrument
to fall within any of the categories (note, bond, stock, and the like) in order to be
considered a security. The problem with the present one-tier analysis is that the context
of the transaction and the policies of the act are intermingled with independent and
objective descriptions of instruments, such as notes and stock, to achieve proper results.
This approach has created interpretive difficulties. See infra text accompanying notes
37-61.
1986]
University of California, Davis
vides a means of reconciling seemingly diverse Supreme Court deci-
sions9 and clarifying the rules that the Court has developed.10
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1985 securities decisions in Gould v.
9 For example, compare Marine Bank, 455 U.S. 551, with Landreth, 105 S. Ct.
2297. In Part IV of the Marine Bank decision, the Court held that a profit-sharing
arrangement between two families was not a security because it was a unique agree-
ment, negotiated one-on-one by the parties and not offered to other investors. Similarly,
Landreth involved a one-on-one negotiated agreement between parties and a nonpublic
offering. Yet, since Landreth involved the purchase of stock and the Court considered
stock to be the paradigm of a security, the Court found a security. Thus, Marine Bank
suggests a case by case approach that considers the circumstances of the transaction.
Landreth suggests that a generalized rule should be applied, regardless of the circum-
stances, to transactions involving stock. Marine Bank and Landreth can be distin-
guished on the grounds that Marine Bank involved the application of an investment
contract and Landreth, the question of stock. This implies that "investment contract" is
a term of art and "stock" a term that refers to state-created instruments. But such a
distinction does not aid in analyzing a term such as "note" that must be viewed both as
a term of art and the name of a class of state-created instruments. Thus, the Marine
Bank and Landreth approaches are somewhat inconsistent in that they do not indicate
when a case by case, transaction-oriented approach is superior to a uniform rule. •
The Ninth Circuit pointed out this inconsistency between the approach to analyzing
stock as opposed to notes in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985):
We see no principled way to justify an analysis in which we determine
whether a note is a "security" within the meaning of the Acts by examin-
ing the transaction in light of the statutory purpose, but determine
whether stock is a "security" by examining only the instrument and not
the transaction in light of the statutory purpose.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 174-230. Under the two-tiered approach an
instrument could fail to be considered a security for two general reasons. An instrument
might not be a security because it did not fall within one of the first tier categories such
as stock, note, or the like. A court would find the appropriate description for each
category through reference to generalized state law. See infra text accompanying notes
154-61. Secondly, an instrument that met the first test could fail to be a security if the
circumstances surrounding the transaction did not justify application of the securities
laws. A court would exclude an instrument for such second tier reasons if the policy
and purposes of the acts did not call for the application of the substantive rules of the
securities acts. This distinction helps clarify the holdings of major cases. Some of the
problems interpreting the securities acts have arisen from the disagreement about the
holdings of key Supreme Court decisions. For example, the controversy over the sale of
business doctrine was generated by confusion over whether the decision in United
Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), required the three-part Howey test to
apply to all securities or only if an instrument did not fall within the core meaning of
other enumerated categories such as stock. For discussion of these contrasting ap-
proaches see Daily, 701 F.2d at 498-99. Under the two-tiered approach, the holding of
Forman is clearer: The shares in the housing cooperative failed the first level because
they did not meet the description for "stock" or "investment contracts." See infra text
accompanying notes 184-92.
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Ruefenachti and Landreth v. Landreth Timber Co., 2 the definition of
a "security"' 8 encountered two notable areas of interpretive difficulty:
the application of the "sale of business" doctrine" and the determina-
tion of which kinds of promissory notes constitute a security.' 5
In Gould and Landreth, the Court held that the sale of business
doctrine did not exclude from the definition of security stock transac-
tions' 6 in which the purchaser obtained significant control of a newly
1' 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985).
12 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985).
" The word "security" is used in two senses in this Article. First, the term "secur-
ity" is the heading of § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982),
and § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982),
referring to situations when the Acts apply. Second, the overall objective of this Article
is to define the term "security." There are two steps to defining the term. In this
Article, the phrase "definition of security" refers to the overall process of using both
steps - first, the categories of instruments and second, the application of the proper
"concept of a security" - to arrive at the proper test for triggering the securities acts.
The term "concept of a security" refers to the second level of analysis - the process by
which instruments that meet the first level are tested as to whether the acts should
apply.
Section 2(1) also uses the term "security" when it refers to "interest or instrument
commonly known as a security." This Article interprets this usage of "security" as
referring to a class of instruments that are defined by state law, similar to stock, note,
or bond. Thus, a court would determine whether an instrument belongs to that class
ostensibly by looking to state law, as with stocks and bonds. This usage of "security" in
the same manner as "stock" or "bond" in § 2(1) should not be confused with the above
two usages. The Supreme Court has held that the meaning of "instrument commonly
known as a security" is the same as "investment contract." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
" Under the sale of business doctrine, purchases of more than 50% of the stock of a
corporation in which the purchaser acquired control of the corporation were not consid-
ered the purchase of a security for purposes of the federal securities acts. See generally
T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 18-19.
iS Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982), and § 3(a)
(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1982), state that
any note is a security unless the context otherwise requires. Short-term commercial
notes are exempt under § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1982), and by
means of the definitional § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982).
The courts have struggled with the issue of what kinds of notes should be considered a
security. Until 1971 all notes generally were considered securities. Subsequently, the
courts scrutinized transactions to exempt those notes that did not have the "economic
realities" of a security or were considered "commercial" and not "investment" notes.
See Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities Under the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 400, 406-
16 (1982) [hereafter Note, Economic Realities].
" Under the sale of business doctrine, the circumstances surrounding the purchase
of stock would be examined to determine whether the purchaser acquired substantial
control over the corporation. Thus, the doctrine was inherently transaction oriented.
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acquired business. 17 Courts previously applying the sale of business
doctrine depended on the rationale that acquisition of a substantial per-
centage of a corporation's stock was in fact a purchase of assets.18
Thus, the form of the transaction (purchase of the enterprise's stock)
was not considered appropriate to trigger the federal securities law.19
The securities acts were meant to protect investors who had given
money to a promoter and had little control over future operation of an
enterprise. On the other hand, courts following the sale of business doc-
For courts willing to find a transfer of substantial control with a sale of less than 100%
of the stock, the doctrine required a case by case approach. For example, the Seventh
Circuit imposed a rebuttable presumption: in transactions resulting in the acquisition of
more than 50% of the stock, no security was involved. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197,
203 (7th Cir. 1982).
17 Courts applying the sale of business doctrine took the view that the three-part test
in SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), established the essential characteristics for all
securities. The third part of the Howey test requires finding the existence of a security
only when the investor is seeking profits "solely from the efforts of [others]." Id. at 299.
Thus, when the investor acquires substantial control over the enterprise into which she
has placed her investment, disclosure and the application of the securities acts are not
required since she has control over her own future and is not at the mercy of a third
party promoter. For discussion of Howey's dual-level theory of a security, see infra text
accompanying notes 130-34. Thus, control over the future of the enterprise is the key to
the application of the sale of business doctrine. Some courts would apply a rebuttable
presumption of such significant control when 50% of the stock is acquired. See Groen,
687 F.2d at 197. Other courts simply have held that a purchase of all the stock of a
corporation is not the purchase of a security without discussing their holding's implica-
tions for percentages less than 100%. See Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1977); see also King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982):
A sale of less than 100% of the stock might not be covered by the Acts. A
sale of 100% of the stock can be covered by the Acts. The number of
sellers and purchasers will not necessarily control the outcome. Once the
literal words of the statute are abandoned for an "economic realities" test,
each case must be evaluated on its own facts to determine if the transac-
tion, though within the letter of the statute, is not within its spirit nor the
intent of the lawmakers.
18 See Chandler, 691 F.2d at 444: "The economic realities of the case at bar show
that the plaintiff was buying a liquor store and, incidently [sic] as an indicia of owner-
ship, was receiving 100% of the stock of the company which owned the store."
11 See Winkler, 673 F.2d at 345 ("Thus, the 'economic realities' of the transaction
indicate not a security transaction, but rather the sale and purchase of a business using
stock merely as a method of vesting the Kings with total ownership."); Frederiksen v.
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981) ("The
plaintiffs sought to acquire NSM's business in its entirety. The 'stock' sale was a
method used to vest ECC with ownership of that business. There was no offer of in-
vestment 'securities.' The stock of NSM merely was passed incidentally as an indicia of
ownership of the business assets sold to ECC." (footnote omitted)).
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trine reasoned that a purchaser who controlled an enterprise had eco-
nomic bargaining powers to compel the kind of disclosure that federal
securities laws required. As enterpreneurs, controlling purchasers were
not the kind of investors the acts assertedly were designed to protect.2"
Since these investors are at the mercy of the promoter, they need full
disclosure.
Gould and Landreth involved purchases of fifty and one hundred
percent of a corporation's stock, respectively. Rejecting the sale of busi-
ness doctrine, the Supreme Court held that stock was the paradigm of a
security. In cases in which stock has all the characteristics associated
with that class of instruments, 2 the application of the securities laws
will not turn on the percentage of stock purchased or on whether con-
trol passed to the purchaser. Since control depends on a number of
factors,2" whether a stock purchase falls within the definition of a se-
" In Landreth, the Supreme Court considered but rejected this rationale for appli-
cation of the sale of business doctrine:
According to respondents, it is clear that petitioner sought not to earn
profits from the efforts of others, but to buy a company that it could man-
age and control. Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, who sought to
"use or consume" the business purchased just as the purchasers in For-
man sought to use the apartments they acquired after purchasing shares of
stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply.
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases.
105 S. Ct. at 2304.
" "First, traditional stock 'represents to many people, both trained and untrained in
business matters, the paradigm of a security.' " Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306 (citing
Daily, 701 F.2d at 500).
22 We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock
as (i) the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of
profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated;
(iv) the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. ...
[I]t is undisputed that the stock involved here possesses all of the charac-
teristics we identified in Forman as traditionally associated with common
stock.
Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302-05 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 850).
93 More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale of business
doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in which less than 100% of
a company's stock was sold. This inevitably would lead to difficult ques-
tions of line drawing. The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not
only on the percentage of stock transferred, but also on such factors as the
number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and veto rights were
agreed upon by the parties.
Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2307. Thus, for example, if the articles of incorporation re-
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curity often would be unclear at the time of purchase. 4 In the Court's
view, the applicability of securities laws should be more predictable."
In Gould, the Court implicitly rejected the idea that every transac-
tion or instrument should satisfy the Howey2' "economic realities" test2"
to be considered a security. Consequently, some instruments that do not
have the economic realities of a security nevertheless will be deemed
securities.28
Subsequent to the demise of the sale of business doctrine, the most
difficult question was which kinds of promissory notes would be consid-
ered securities.2 9 At one point, lower federal courts adopted a literal
approach, holding that all promissory notes were securities.3 0 The test
quired a supermajority of 75% to approve extraordinary corporate changes such as an
amendment of the articles, merger, or dissolution, the mere acquisition of 51% would
not give full control.
"' "As we explain more fully in [Gould, 105 S. Ct. 2308], decided today as a com-
panion to this case, coverage by the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknow-
able to the parties at the time the stock was sold." Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2307.
, "These uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would hardly be in
the best interests of either party to a transaction." Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2307.
In considering these claims we again must examine the substance - the
economic realities of the transaction - rather than the names that may
have been employed by the parties. We perceive no distinction, for present
purposes, between an "investment contract" and an "instrument com-
monly known as a security." In either case, the basic test for distinguish-
ing the transaction from other commercial dealings is "whether the scheme
involves an investment in a common enterprise with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others." Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. This test, in short-
hand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the
Court's decisions defining a security.
Forman, 421 U.S. at 851-52.
" The term "economic realities" is used to indicate the essence or fundamental
structure of a security. The term originally was used in Forman, 421 U.S. at 849:
"Because securities transactions are economic in character Congress intended the appli-
cation of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and
not on the name appended thereto." Subsequent courts considered the Howey test, see
supra note 26, to be the economic reality of a security, see Winkler, 673 F.2d at 344,
on the basis of the Forman Court's application of that test.
IS In Landreth, we held that. where an instrument bears the label "stock"
and possesses all the characteristics typically associated with . . . stock a
court will not be required to look beyond the character of the instrument
to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the
stock is a "security" within the meaning of the Acts.
Gould, 105 S. Ct. at 2310 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 851).
:9 See supra note 15.
80 See Note, Economic Realities, supra note 15, at 406 n.39. See also Lehigh Valley
Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1969) (dicta that
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shifted, however, when the courts balked at applying securities laws to
commercial and consumer-oriented transactions not involving the dan-
gers and risks of investment notes."1 From then on, the courts turned to
the "investment-commercial" dichotomy and applied the securities acts
only to investment-oriented notes. .2 Since many types of investment-
oriented promissory notes exist, different judicial tests have prolifer-
ated."3 Some courts have applied a factorial analysis, " others a "family
resemblance" or "cluster" test, 5 and still others a "risk-capital"
analysis.36
Gould and Landreth may give clues on how to resolve the interpre-
tive problems involving notes. Two alternatives remain. First, the
courts could treat notes the same way the Supreme Court in Gould and
Landreth treated stock. Thus, if an instrument has all the characteris-
tics common to a note, it is a security. Under this approach the various
formulations of economic reality or investment structure would not be
used to exempt some notes from coverage under the acts. A second ap-
proach would be to treat notes differently from stock, only including
within the concept of a security those notes with the appropriate invest-
ment or risk-capital structure.3 7
Aside from the problem of notes, Gould and Landreth leave unan-
swered other important interpretive questions. For example, courts
almost all notes are securities).
" See generally Lipton & Katz, Notes Are (Are Not?) Always Securities - A Re-
view, 29 Bus. LAw. 861, 866 (1974).
32 See CNS Enters. v. G. & G. Enters., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Lino v.
City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463
F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
38 See generally Note, Economic Realities, supra note 15.
34 See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (9th Cir.
1976) (noting as important factors: duration of the note, extent of collateralization,
form of note, circumstances of issuance, relationship between amount borrowed and
size of borrower's business, and contemplated use of proceeds).
"' See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir.
1976) (securities acts should apply to transaction when a note bears no "strong family
resemblance" to consumer and commercial notes).
S" See Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Commercial Credit Business
Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); El Khadem
v. Equity Serv. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). See
also Hunt, Madame El Khadem, the Ninth Circuit, and the Risk Capital Approach,
57 OR. L. REV. 3 (1977).
" This is the approach now taken by all courts that have rejected the literal
approach.
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often have considered the term "investment contract" a catch-all
phrase."8 Does the investment contract category act as a residual catch-
all vehicle for instruments that fail to qualify for other categories? As-
sume, for example, the investment-commercial dichotomy is the appli-
cable test for notes. Furthermore, suppose a note was too commercial to
meet the test. May a plaintiff argue disjunctively that, although failing
the note test, the instrument qualifies as an investment contract? Simi-
larly, suppose certain forms of stock did not meet the test for stock
because they lacked some essential characteristic of stock. " Could a
plaintiff argue alternatively that it was an investment contract?40
Another question after Gould and Landreth is whether the Court's
holding that stock is defined by reference to its usual characteristics
applies to other enumerated instruments such as notes, treasury stock,
bonds, and debentures. If so, how should one determine the characteris-
tics of these instruments? Is state law the appropriate test, and if so, is
it general state law41 or specifically the law of the state of incorpora-
tion?42 A similar issue is whether the term "investment contract" is the
name of a class of instruments defined by state law or a catch-all
" In Howey the Supreme Court asserted that the concept of an investment contract
was flexible: "It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits." Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. While
the concept may be flexible, this Article urges that it is best not to interpret an invest-
ment contract in a catch-all fashion. See generally Groen, 687 F.2d at 200 (viewing as
a catch-all phrase the term "instrument commcnly known as a security."). The Su-
preme Court in Forman, 421 U.S. at 852, stated that "instrument commonly known as
a security" and "investment contract" are essentially the same. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 143-53.
s9 For example, assuming the stock was nonvoting or did not pay dividends (see
Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 Ill. 2d 471, 272 N.E.2d 1 (1971) (considering
validity of stock that had no dividend rights or rights on dissolution)), it is not likely
that a court would consider such stock to be stock for securities act purposes. In For-
man, 421 U.S. at 851, the Court identified the right to receive dividends as one of the
critical characteristics of the kind of stock that will be considered a security.
40 If plaintiffs could argue that an instrument was stock, then, failing that, argue
that it was nevertheless an investment contract, the legislative intent behind the use of
terms such as "stock" or "note" might be undermined. If the legislature intended to
exclude commercial notes from coverage by the securities acts, to allow the Acts to cover
notes because they fit the test for investment contracts would subvert the proper inter-
pretation of "note." The two terms "note" and "investment contract" should be read
together, so that one term does not undermine the purpose served by the other.
4' See infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
"' See id.
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phrase determined by federal common law.4"
A further interpretive question focuses on the term "security." Is
"security" the name of a class of instruments like "stock" or is it the
name of a general category made up of subcategories such as stock?
Does the term "security" have exactly the same contours as the terms
by which it is exemplified? In other words, one view is that the term
"security" is like the term "fruit" because it has the same coverage as
the items that constitute the extension 4 of that term. This view sug-
gests a one-tier analysis. Thus, to know the meaning of the term
"fruit" one need only know what an apple, orange, and other fruits
are. Similarly, to know what a security is, one need only know what a
stock, bond, debenture, and other such instruments are.
On the other hand, the meaning of the term security may not be
totally congruent with its paradigm instruments or most familiar exam-
ples. Take for example the following definitional section: "(1) The
term life-prolonging fruit means any fresh fruit, orange, apple, cran-
berry, pear, plum . . . unless the context otherwise requires." Unlike
the one-tiered definition of "fruit" above, the definition of "life-pro-
longing fruit" is two tiered. One does not know the exact definition of
the term by knowing the objects listed. Certain plums, for example,
may be excluded if they do not meet the criteria of being life prolong-
ing. Perhaps, for instance, the context in which such plums are used,
such as canned plums, may disqualify them from being life prolonging.
Similarly, the meaning of sections defining a security may be two
tiered. Gould and Landreth give no clear indication.
Finally, as a jurisprudential concern, one must question the validity
of including policy considerations relating to the securities acts them-
selves in the definitional terms that trigger application of the acts."5
The use of policy to interpret definitions can be unfair to parties. Nor-
mal expectations as to language may be upset. Moreover, the statute
may not fairly give adequate notice that it applies to one's conduct.
43 See infra text accompanying notes 143-53.
4 The traditional theory of meaning in philosophy of language held that "intension
determines extension." The difference between intension and extension is the following:
"The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as 'lemon' is often called the
intension of the term 'lemon.' This intension determines what it is to be a lemon. Thus,
according to traditional theories, intension determines extension." NAMING, NECES-
SITY, AND NATURAL KINDS 14 (S. Schwartz ed. 1977) [hereafter NAMING, NECES-
SITY]; see also A. FLEW, A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 109 (1982): "The extension
of a general term, predicate, or concept is made up of all those entities to which the
term or predicate correctly applies, or which fall under the concept."
45 See infra text accompanying notes 91-118.
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Such self-referencing, policy-oriented definitions may allow courts to
apply retroactively a substantive regulatory scheme when the parties
could not have ascertained the regulation's applicability at the time of
their conduct. The Court in Gould and Landreth rejected the sale of
business doctrine partly for these reasons."' On the other hand, most of
the Court's decisions defining "security" and "investment contract"
have relied on the securities acts' policies."7
These interpretive questions demand theoretical reconciliation. The
problems of interpreting these definitional sections resemble the classi-
cal problems in philosophy of language involving meaning4s and refer-
ence." Problems of reference arise because one must determine the
referent50 for terms such as "stock," "note," and "investment contract."
Moreover, there is the overall question of what is meant by the term
"security." Is it an open vehicle for interpretation in the sense of being
an essentially contested concept?5 Or does its meaning depend on the
drafters' original intention when they created the language? 52
The following section suggests three major concerns that the raft of
46 See Gould, 105 S. Ct. at 2311: "Therefore, under respondents' theory, the Acts'
applicability to a sale of stock such as that involved here would rarely be certain at the
time of the transaction." See also Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2308: "We find more daunt-
ing, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction may never know whether they
are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a
concept as often elusive as the passage of control." Accord Golden v. Garafalo, 678
F.2d 1139, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1982).
"" See, e.g., Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558 (reasoning that FDIC guarantee of a CD
eliminates risk that acts were designed to address); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979) (since ERISA regulates pensions plans, it is un-
necessary to subject pension plans to coverage of the federal securities acts).
46 Thus, the goal of defining the term "security" is to discover what it means. For
discussion of theories of meaning, see generally W. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF LAN-
GUAGE 10-49 (1964).
" The referential theory is a theory of meaning. Basically, it asserts that to under-
stand the meaning of a word is to understand the concept or referent to which the word
refers. See id. at 12. As used here, the term "reference" means that the definitional
term "security" refers to specific instruments such as stock, notes, and the like. The
meaning of the term "security," however, may be different from simply the whole set of
stocks, notes, and the like. Certain notes may be excluded from the definition of a
security, for example, because they are not of an investment nature.
10 See A. FLEW, supra note 44, at 279 ("[R]eferent. That to which a word refers.
Cows are thus the referents of the word 'cows.' ").
61 See Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEED-
INGS (n.s.) 167 (1955-56).
"' As opposed to being essentially contested, the term "security" arguably should be
construed in light of its legislative history. See generally Daily, 701 F.2d at 500 n.5.
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articles"3 and cases on the subject have not addressed. First, the defini-
tion of a security should be divided into referential64 and attributive 5
components. The referential component refers to independently ex-
isting, state-created instruments.56 The attributive component distin-
guishes among these instruments by describing the proper circum-
stances calling for application of the acts.57 These two functions must
be systematically differentiated.
The second concern will be termed the objection against self-refer-
encing, policy-oriented definitions.58 The third concern is whether
terms such as "stock," "note," and "investment contract" should be
viewed as instruments (reified objects) or rather as a nexus-of-commer-
cial relationships."
The logical meaning of these definitional securities acts sections
should follow a two-tiered approach: the terms "stock," "bond," and
the like are treated as instruments whose characteristics are defined by
sources outside of the federal securities acts, such as state law. Once an
instrument meets the state-created criteria for inclusion, it has met the
first test. The second tier is the concept of a security.60 The purposes
" The literature on the subject is vast. The amount that has been written solely on
the sale of business doctrine is itself impressive. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,
731 F.2d 1348, 1351 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984).
" The term "referential" means that the speaker had a definite idea in mind to
which she was referring when using the term. See infra text accompanying notes 72-
77.
" By "attributive" it is meant that the speaker may not have anything in particular
in mind when using a term, but nevertheless can make meaningful statements using
such a term. See id.
" The referential component of the term "security" has as its referent stock, notes,
bonds, debentures, investment contracts, and other categories specifically mentioned in
the definitional sections. These instruments are state created in the sense that the cate-
gories are defined by state law in much the same way that state law creates and defines
the property interests that the Constitution protects. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
" The attributive aspect of the term "security" is an open-textured concept much
like the term "due process."
" The basis of this objection is that threshold terms such as "security" or "prop-
erty" (for the purposes of U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) should not be described in refer-
ence to the results that would be triggered by finding the existence of a security or
property. See infra text accompanying notes 91-118.
" See infra text accompanying notes 119-73.
1o See supra note 13. The concept of security should be distinguished from the defi-
nition of a security. The concept of security is the concept or test by which instruments
such as stocks, notes, and the like are excluded or included as securities that trigger the
application of the acts. The definition of the term "security" refers to the usage of the
word security in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) - the task of
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and requirements of the securities acts define this concept. It does not
have a reference in state-created sources. The nature and structure of
the concept of a security determine to which instruments among the
stocks, notes, and investment contracts the federal securities acts should
apply.61
Part I of this Article explains the function of the referential and at-
tributive components, and demonstrates why a two-tiered model is nec-
essary to separate the referential from the attributive level. 2 Part II
discusses the importance of avoiding self-referencing, policy-oriented
definitions that trigger application of the acts.63 Part III stresses the
necessity of maintaining the reified quality of notes, stocks, bonds, and
other instruments." Part IV reinterprets the major Supreme Court de-
cisions defining a security under the suggested two-tiered model." Part
V discusses the concept of a security, including several important ques-
tions. One critical issue is whether the concept of a security is of con-
junctive or cluster form."' A second question is how to derive the con-
considering both the referential and attributive aspects of the term to reach the proper
result.
61 Thus, the second tier concept of a security acts as a transaction exemption. Stocks,
notes, bonds, and the like that properly fall within these categories may be exempt
depending on the circumstances surrounding the particular transaction.
:2 See infra text accompanying notes 69-90.
ea See infra text accompanying notes 91-118.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-73.
'6 See infra text accompanying notes 174-247.
Traditional theories of meaning held that a term was defined by the conjunction
of properties associated with that term.
On the traditional view, the meaning of, say, "lemon," is given by specify-
ing a conjunction of properties. For each of these properties, the statement
"lemons have the property P" is an analytic truth; and if P1, P2, . . . Pn
are all of the properties in the conjunction, then "anything with all of the
properties P1, . . . , is a lemon" is likewise an analytic truth.
Putnam, Is Semantics Possible?, in NAMING, NECESSITY, supra note 44, at 103 (em-
phasis in original). According to others, however, some terms are not defined by a
conjunction of properties but rather by a cluster of properties.
For example, it is held that we cannot define "game" by a conjunction of
properties such as having a winner and a loser, being entertaining, and
involving the gaining and losing of points because some perfectly accept-
able games lack some of these features. According to the cluster theory,
something is a game because it has enough features from a cluster of
properties like these. A cluster theorist would claim that there need not be
any property in the cluster that is sufficient for the application of the
term, but he nevertheless would hold that the cluster taken as a whole
determines the extension of the term. Wittgenstein's position that there are
only family resemblances among the individuals in the extension of many
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cept. Was the concept intended to be essentially open 7 and thus a
vehicle for judicial lawmaking, or should the courts strive to adhere to
an original legislative concept of a security? If such an original concept
exists, how do courts adhere to this original conception?
This Article concludes that while Congress may not have articulated
the original concept behind the attributive aspect of a security, the
courts can, by a process of "asking the right questions," 8 focus on that
original concept in a manner that follows legislative intent.
I. REFERENTIAL AND ATTRIBUTIVE ASPECTS OF THE DEFINITION
OF A SECURITY
Close examination of the sections that define a security reveals that
the drafters had two things in mind. The terms "stock," "bond,"
"note," and the like suggest a referential use and indicate that the
drafters conceived of certain items when they thought of a security. In
addition, their use of the qualifying language "unless the context other-
wise requires" '' demonstrates that the drafters intended the concept of
a security to extend beyond these enumerated instruments.7 0 They also
intended the concept of a security to be attributive. In other words,
while the drafters did not have in mind all possible circumstances that
would show the presence of a security, they nevertheless set down the
legal consequences attaching to anything later deemed a security.
1
ordinary terms can be construed as a version of the cluster theory.
Id. at 15. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. An-
scombe trans. 3d ed. 1976).
07 See generally H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961). Like the term "due
process," the term "security" may deliberately have been left open to allow future
courts to apply an appropriate meaning in light of the contemporary demands of the
commercial world.
08 See infra text accompanying notes 231-47. By "right questions" the author refers
to the process of determining which facts are outcome determinative. For example, in
the problem of determining which notes should be securities, the outcome-determinative
facts might include the form of a note, the degree of collateralization, the relationship
between the parties, and the degree of participation by others. Whether such questions
might be outcome determinative can be discerned by an inductive process in which the
judge examines the outcome-determinative facts of prior holdings.
'9 See § 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982); § 3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1982).
70 The existence of this qualifying phrase has been used to justify doctrines that may
exclude some stock or notes. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 556.
11 The use of the qualifying phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" argues
that the definition of a security in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(1) (1982), and § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982), is, at
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Thus, the term "security" has both a referential and attributive com-
ponent. "Referential" means that the speaker has a definite idea in
mind to which she refers when using a term. "Attributive" means that
the speaker may not have anything in particular in mind when using
the term, but that she still can make meaningful statements about the
term. 7 Philosopher Keith S. Donnellan gives a good example of the
difference between referential and attributive use in his example of the
term "Smith's murderer.
7
Suppose first that we came upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the
brutal manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most lovable
person in the world, we might exclaim, "Smith's murderer is insane." I
will assume, to make it a simpler case, that in a quite ordinary sense we
do not know who murdered Smith . . . . This, I shall say, is an attribu-
tive use of the definite description.
Now, consider a referential use of "Smith's Murderer."74
[S]uppose that Jones has been charged with Smith's murder and has been
placed on trial. Imagine that there is discussion of Jones's odd behavior at
this trial. We might sum up our impression of his behavior by saying,
"Smith's murderer is insane." If someone asks to whom we are referring,
by using this description, the answer here is "Jones." This, I shall say, is
a referential use of definite description.
The distinction between referential and attributive uses has other im-
portant consequences.7 For purposes of this discussion, it proves that
sensible statements can be made about a security without having in
mind a definite image or conception of a security. In law, terms such as
"due process" are used attributively to allow subsequent interpreters
the opportunity to give appropriate content to their meaning.76 The
lack of a fixed and definite conception of due process does not, however,
impede those originally coining the phrase from making meaningful le-
gal statements about the consequences that attach to due process.
Many of the interpretive difficulties with the provisions that define a
security stem from the drafters' design that the provisions be both refer-
least in part, "open-textured" or attributive.
72 See generally Donnellan, Reference and Definite Descriptions, in NAMING, NE-
CESSITY, supra note 44, at 65.
73 Id. at 46-47.
74 Id.
7' Donnellan's paper goes on to point out that attributive use can produce paradoxi-
cal results. See generally id.
76 In a similar vein, Dworkin argues that "vague" terms like "cruel and unusual
punishment" are meant to give the court the right to apply a concept of cruel and
unusual that can be different from a possible original conception of cruel and unusual.
See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977).
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ential and attributive. These sections are referential in that they refer to
such distinct instruments as stock. Yet, they are also open and attribu-
tive because their application is uncertain in many instances. 7
Legal scholars often speak about the "core" and "open texture" of
legal terms.7 8 The referential aspect of these definitional sections, which
identify enumerated instruments as the paradigms of a security, is the
core of these provisions.79 The open texture lies in the ambiguity that
the use of a contextual qualification creates. 80
Most decisions and commentary on the definition of a security have
not consciously viewed the term in this bifurcated sense.81 Yet, one
should recognize this distinction because a conflict between the attribu-
tive and referential aspects inevitably will develop. The emergence of
77 The problem in determining which notes should be deemed securities is an exam-
ple of the attributive component of the term "security." The notes that should be secur-
ities under an attributive concept would be "those notes, given the goals of the legisla-
tion, which should be deemed securities." The open quality of this phrase bears out its
attributive nature.
" See generally H. HART, supra note 67, at 124-25: "[U]ncertainty at the border-
line is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of
communication concerning matters of fact. Natural languages like English are when so
used irreducibly open textured." The "core" of any term or legal rule consists of the
clear, paradigm cases. See id. at 125:
When we are bold enough to frame some general rule of conduct (e.g., a
rule that no vehicle may be taken into a park), the language used in this
context fixes necessary conditions which anything must satisfy if it is to be
within its scope, and certain clear examples of what is certainly within its
scope may be present to our minds. They are the paradigm, clear cases
(the motor-car, the bus, the motor-cycle); and our aim in legislating is so
far determinate because we have made a certain choice.
See also Waismann, Verifiability, in ESSAYS ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117-30 (A.
Flew ed. 1960).
'9 The actual core of the term "security" may be different from simply the sets of all
stocks, notes, bonds, and other instruments in a first tier category. If "core" refers to
clear or settled paradigm cases, then the notion of a core combines the first and second
tier. After Gould and Landreth, ordinary business stock would clearly be within this
core. See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306 (stock is the paradigm of a security).
80 The prefatory phrase "unless the context otherwise requires," appearing in the
definitional sections, allows the circumstances of the transaction to justify the exclusion
of certain notes, bonds, or the like from characterization as a security.
" The Court in Landreth notes the difference between paradigm cases such as stock
(see supra note 79) and other categories that may be open textured in nature: "We
here expressly leave until another day the question whether 'notes' or 'bonds' or some
other category of instrument listed in the definition might be shown 'by proving [only]
the document itself.' " Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306. However, the Court has not ex-
plicitly commented on the referential or attributive nature of the term "security."
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the sale of business doctrine 2 is recent evidence of this conflict. That
doctrine acknowledges the tension between the clear notion of reference
in the term "stock" and the policies used to interpret the term "invest-
ment contract," which manifests an attributive use of "security." By
rejecting the sale of business doctrine, Gould and Landreth indicate
that the concept of a security is both referential and attributive, and not
solely attributive as the sale of business doctrine implies."3
Most courts and commentators addressing this issue have attempted
to resolve the conflict using a one-tier approach." In a one-tier ap-
proach, the enumerated categories of instruments such as stocks and
bonds are given the same weight as the catch-all term "investment con-
tract." Considered on the same level, it is not clear which has domi-
nance. Thus, interpretive problems, such as the sale of business doc-
trine, emerge when "investment contract" analysis assertedly renders
the term "stock" surplusage.8"
The two-tiered approach is advantageous because it separates refer-
ential and attributive aspects of the term "security" into two distinct
levels of analysis. The first level is referential and refers to instruments
defined and created by state law. The second level is attributive and
excludes those transactions that do not justify application of the federal
securities acts. This approach provides a logical and simple way of de-
termining whether the particular analysis refers to state law or inter-
pretation, incorporating securities acts policies.8" Moreover, the model
performs important functions: it preserves the referential nature of the
82 See supra text accompanying notes 11-28.
83 The essence of the sale of business doctrine is that every candidate for characteri-
zation as a security had to meet the three-part Howey test: (1) investment of money for
profit; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3) solely from the efforts of others. Howey, 328
U.S. at 293. As investment contract analysis was applied, the analysis was basically
attributive in nature because it did not define clear referents that would constitute a
security. Hence, the rejection of the economic realities approach, suggested by courts
advocating the sale of business doctrine, was a rejection of the view that the definitional
sections were completely attributive. The determination that stock would always be
deemed a security, whether or not it met the economic realities test, indicated that the
definitional sections were, indeed, partly referential.
" Most courts supporting the sale of business doctrine suggested a one-tier analysis.
See Chandler, 691 F.2d at 443; Groen, 687 F.2d at 197; Winkler, 673 F.2d at 342;
Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
" If the three-part Howey test constitutes the necessary and sufficient definition of a
security to which all first tier instruments (stocks, notes, bonds, and the like) must be
subjected, then the definition may as well read, "A security is any investment contract."
This would make any other words used in the definition (such as stock) surplusage.
" See infra text accompanying notes 174-219.
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term "security" and avoids the danger of self-reference in definition."7
Furthermore, the model preserves the instrument-like quality of the
categories that constitute the first level so that they cannot be taken
apart by characterizing the nature of the transaction.88 Above all, the
two-tiered model represents a more sophisticated approach to recon-
ciling seemingly diverse Supreme Court decisions. 89 Without apparent
awareness of this two-tiered format, the Court has demonstrated a pat-
tern of reasoning that fits within the model. This may be because the
model represents a natural way of sorting the inherent referential and
attributive aspects of legal terms such as "security." '9
II. THE OBJECTION AGAINST SELF-REFERENCING POLICY-
ORIENTED THRESHOLD DEFINITIONS
Since only securities can trigger the securities acts, then, at least in
part, a security must be an item or instrument defined by sources of
law9' outside the securities acts. Otherwise, if the goals of the regula-
tory acts defined the triggering concept of a security, then the acts
would apply when a judge decided in hindsight that the act's goals
would be served thereby, rather than when the parties activated the
regulatory scheme by use of a security. 92 In other words, if the term
8' See infra text accompanying notes 91-118.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 119-73. The sale of business doctrine is an
example of cases in which instruments are deconstructed on the grounds of the nature
of the transaction. The sale of business doctrine held that stock sometimes was a secur-
ity and sometimes was not. Thus, the transactional nature of the use of the stock trig-
gered the appropriate ramifications. Cases involving piercing the corporate veil also
demonstrate the deconstruction of the reified corporate entity on the basis of the nature
of the transaction. See generally Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV.
979, 983 (1971).
89 See supra note 9; infra text accompanying notes 174-230.
90 The two-tiered approach may be natural in the sense that many legal terms have
the same bifurcated referential/attributive, core/open-texture nature demonstrated by
the term "security." Thus, prior judicial experience with this process may lead to a
reflexive, if unarticulated, application of a two-tier approach.
91 From a logical point of view, the term "security" must include some means of
referring to the world outside of the securities acts. Otherwise, it would be completely
self-referencing. See infra text accompanying notes 112-13. Even if the set defining the
concept of a security were purely the creation of the securities acts, it would have no
practical effect unless it could correspond to extrinsic objects. In the same manner num-
bers, as parts of mathematical systems, must correspond with items outside of the set of
numbers to have meaning. Thus, for example, "four" means "four birds" or "four
people." Otherwise, the number "four" would have no practical meaning to us.
" The very nature of the concept of a security is that it triggers the application of
the securities acts. In other words, we know what the securities acts are by knowing
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"security" were solely attributive and defined in the sense of transac-
tions or instruments to which the acts ought to apply, the normal se-
quence of legal reasoning would be inverted. Judges first would ex-
amine transactions to see if the acts should apply. Thus, if an investor
needed the protection of the acts because she made an investment
through a promoter and relinquished control, then the acts ought to
apply. Consequently, the judge would find the existence of a security.
The problem with applying such a purely attributive approach to the
concept of a security is that it employs a self-referencing use of the term
"security" (it means whatever it should mean). This deprives parties of
fair warning that the securities laws might apply when they enter into
transactions.9" There is a danger that judges would consider the merits
of the claim before considering whether the parties have activated the
Act's triggering mechanism.9' For instance, if the claim were fraud and
the judge found significant evidence of deception and injury, the ques-
tion of whether a security were involved might not be given serious
consideration in light of the desire to provide a remedy. On the other
hand, judges might dismiss the claims of wealthy or sophisticated plain-
tiffs on the ground that no security was involved because judges may
what securities are. If we do not know what securities are (either in a referential or
attributive sense) then we have no real understanding of the securities acts. Hence, if
the definition of a security is "whatever the judge feels would best effectuate the pur-
poses of the Acts," we face the possibility that we will not know when the Acts are
applicable. Eventually, if judges developed a pattern and practice of what to "best effec-
tuate purposes of the Acts" means, providing concrete examples, we could develop a
judgment about the meaning of "security." Until then, there would be a lack of predict-
ability as to the application of Acts.
:3 If a security will be deemed to exist when purposes of the Acts will be effectuated,
the judge will look at the nature of the fraud alleged and ask whether the plaintiff was
the kind of person (an investor) whom the Acts were designed to protect. In advance of
such litigation parties could not be expected to resolve such complex questions and
would be uncertain about the application of the Acts. We might describe this uncer-
tainty by stating that it is unclear whether a security exists in this particular
transaction.
" Thus, what should be a threshold issue, namely whether the requisite security
exists for the court and parties to begin thinking about the application of the Acts,
instead can become a laborious, time consuming discovery process. See, e.g., Gould, 105
S. Ct. at 2311 ("Therefore, under respondents' theory, the Acts' applicability to a sale
of stock such as that involved here would rarely be certain at the time of the transaction
. . . . Rather, it would depend on findings of fact made by a court - often only after
extensive discovery and litigation."). See also Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,
532 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1976) (motion for dismissal ending up as motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the lower court considered much evidentiary
material).
[Vol. 19:403
Definition of a Security
feel that such parties do not need the protection of the act.95
Moreover, applying a policy-oriented definition of security would vi-
olate the "plain meaning" of these definitional sections and upset basic
judicial norms of reliance and fairness. 6 The term security would be-
come a term of art despite the plain meaning of words such as "stock,"
"note," and "bond." The use of terms in a self-referencing, policy-ori-
ented manner undermines the authenticity of language" used in law,
implying that there is a "private language" among lawyers who spe-
cialize in particular areas.9
An example of a self-referencing, policy-oriented definition is the Su-
" So-called rich and smart investors have usually been exempted, in some form or
other, from the application of the registration provisions. See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v.
American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendants relying on
sophistication of plaintiffs as a defense); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp.
609 (D. Del. 1971) (noting that investors must have both "access" and "sophistica-
tion"). See generally § 4(6) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982);
former rule 146, 17 C.F.R. 230.146 (repealed); Present regulation D, codifed at 17
C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1985). As to the antifraud provisions, the sale of business doc-
trine was based on the argument that those acquiring a controlling interest in a busi-
ness were entrepreneurs who were not among the intended group of investors to be
protected by the Acts. See cases cited supra note 84.
" Under the "plain meaning" rule, when the language of a provision, statute, or
text is clear, that meaning must be adopted. Applying the plain meaning in these in-
stances is only fair because it is assumed that this was the clear intent of the legislature.
Moreover, plain meaning gives great weight to the argument that parties have relied on
a single interpretation. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
See generally McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1982).
" The authenticity of language is undermined when words no longer have meaning
even close to their original meaning. In such a situation, as in using a term of art, we
must always put quotation marks around the word. By the use of these, we signal to
others that we are intending to use the word in a special, nonordinary way. But to use
a word in this form is not to use that word at all but some other word. If too much of
this goes on, the language basically degenerates into a private one, subverting the whole
purpose of language itself. See generally S. KRIPKE, WIrTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND
PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982).
1s This text does not use the term "private language" in Wittgenstein's sense.
Rather, "private language" refers to the specialized use of terms of art (as in "nonpub-
lic"; see infra text accompanying notes 99-104), which makes the language used by
lawyers a code or cipher that only they can understand. The increasing use of special-
ized terms of art perpetuates the notion that law is elite, mystical, and not available to
the understanding of the lay person. For example, consider all of the kinds of corpora-
tions: "de facto corporation," "de jure corporation," "Subchapter S. corporation," "pro-
fessional corporation," "collapsible corporation" (defined as one having "§ 341 assets"),
"501(c)(3) corporation," and "controlled corporation." A lay person would have diffi-
culty grasping the differences among these types of corporations.
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preme Court's interpretation of the term "non-public offering" in Se-
curities & Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co." At issue
was the meaning of a provision exempting certain transactions from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act.10 ° Instead of defining
"non-public" with reference to the common or plain meaning of the
term "public,"' ' the Court defined the term in reference to the goals of
the legislation. 0 2 Since the purpose of the Act is to provide information
to those who could benefit by disclosure, the Court defined "non-public
offering" as an offering to those who economically and intellectually
could fend for themselves.'03 Thus, subsequent case law and rules have
employed the term "non-public offering" in a manner having no rela-
tionship to the plain meaning of the term "non-public. 1 0 4 The term
"non-public offering" has become a term of art and really means "of-
fering to persons not in need of the protection of the Act." Only those
familiar with the subsequent history of the term are on notice that it
has this cipher-like character.' 5 Moreover, as more courts define terms
solely with reference to the Act's goals, the lawmaking role of the
courts expands.' Substituting judicially created specialized meanings
for terms that had a plain and common meaning allows the courts to
usurp the legislative role.' 07
- 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
'0 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
101 "Public" is defined as: "1) of, pertaining to, or affecting a population or commu-
nity as a whole; 2) open to all persons." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1096 (College ed. 1969). Thus, "nonpublic" normally would re-
fer to an offering not made in a public manner, or to the community at large.
10 "Keeping in mind the broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation,
. . . the focus of inquiry should be the need of the offerees for the protections afforded
by registration." Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 126-27.
103 Id. at 124-25.
10 See generally SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972)
(the ultimate test of whether an offering is public or private is whether the particular
class of persons affected needs protection of the Act); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) (the question of public offering is one of
fact and must depend upon the circumstances of each case); regulation D (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.501-.506 (1985)) (Rules Promulgated to Effectuate the Securities Act of
1933), former rule 146, Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
100 By "cipher" is meant that the term "nonpublic offering" has become a code
word, or symbol (like X) for a much different meaning.
' Allowing courts to determine whether the goals of the act are being met gives
them wide discretion to fashion law and results. In this manner, the judiciary and not
the legislature becomes the lawmaker. Antitrust laws illustrate this. The Sherman Act
provides a very broad design that the courts must fill in.
10 By disregarding plain meaning, courts usurp the legislative role, supplanting
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Furthermore, one expects the threshold or entitlement concepts that
trigger the application of substantive law to exist independently from
the law itself.10 8 For example, the Constitution protects property but
does not define it. Hence, a court analyzing whether some interest is
property must turn to sources outside of the Constitution.10 9 To deter-
mine whether a professor's interest in tenure is property, a court would
refer to rights created by state law. 10
The threshold concept of a security can be viewed as an entitle-
ment... much like property or liberty in the Constitution. The securi-
ties acts determine the protection given those participating in securities
transactions. However, the acts must, at least in part, refer to instru-
ments created outside of the acts themselves. By necessity, the abstrac-
tions of the securities acts must relate to the real world." 2 Since law is
intended to act upon real individuals, the securities legislation must
have some reference to the world of real individuals. Thus, even though
their own intention when the legislature's intent was clear. See Remillard Brick Co. v.
Remillard-Dandini, 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952) (interpreting a corpora-
tion statute such that "or" means "and"). In Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202, the
Court stated:
[I]f, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any
other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we
believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it
must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision
to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesi-
tation, unite in rejecting application.
108 For example, the entitlement interest of property which accords a person due
process treatment is defined by understandings and expectations generated by state law
sources. As the Court stated in Roth, 408 U.S. at 577: "Property interests, of course,
are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law - rules or understandings that secure certain benefits . . . ." Moreover,
in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972), the Court added: "A person's inter-
est in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if there are such rules
or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit
and that he may invoke at a hearing."
109 Whether reasonable expectations or positive state statutory rights form the basis
for a property interest has been the center of extensive judicial debate. See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-10, 10-11, at 522-32 (1978).
"0 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 564.
1.. Both "security" and "property" are entitlements. One must have them in order
to obtain access to the protective scheme of the securities acts or the Constitution. In
other words, to benefit, one must possess either a security or the requisite kind of
property.
11. See supra note 91.
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a 501(c)(3) corporation is an abstraction of the tax code,' 13 it must re-
fer to a type of corporation. A corporation is a concept that obtains its
meaning from sources of law outside the tax code. Finally, the state law
sources that define a corporation declare how this abstraction relates to
the rights and duties of real individuals." 4
Thus, like constitutional provisions, the securities laws must refer at
some level to entities or instruments outside of the scheme of securities
laws. 5 Normally, such outside reference is accomplished by threshold
or triggering concepts such as property or security."" More concrete
usage of the term results in greater fairness to the parties. The more
vague or policy referenced the term, the more difficulty parties have
determining whether their conduct comes within the scope of the legis-
lation. This concern for independent definition and objective clarity in
the case of threshold concepts is more significant than the concern
about vague terms in statutory interpretation generally." 7 As stated
"' A "501(c)(3) corporation" would be a corporation eligible to receive charitable
contributions.
114 In this manner the "fictitious" legal world of corporations interacts with real
"persons." Yet the deconstruction can continue even further. "Person" is a legal con-
cept that allows a continuity of legal consequences to affect a changing human individ-
ual. Thus, the contracts made by a man who is 20 will be enforced against him at age
40, even though every cell in his body has changed, or even though he has undergone a
complete personality change. See Hume, The Theory of Personal Identity, reprinted in
W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS 234-37 (1972); see also Mor-
row, The Burnout of Almost Everyone, TIME, Sept. 21, 1981, at 84 (noting a concept
similar to Hume's, The "Doctrine of Discontinuous Selves"). It may be simplistic, al-
beit necessary, to say that state law sources define how the abstraction of a corporation
interfaces with real individuals. However, it may not be so simple at all.
"6 See supra note 91.
116 A statutory scheme must be composed of at least two elements, substantive rules
and predicate conditions that determine when the rules apply. In other words, statutes
can be viewed as a number of if/then statements. The purpose of a concept like a
security is to simplify the predicate conditions for knowing when the securities laws
generally apply. Thus, simple possession of a security or property puts a community on
notice of the possible application of the substantive rules. The simpler the triggering
concept, the more easily a society is apprised of the possible consequences. The more
complicated the predicate conditions, as in the case of Racketeering, Influence and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. ; 1961 (1982), the less advance awareness
members of the community have of the possible application of the substantive rules.
Thus, keeping these access concepts relatively simple is a fundamental element of fair-
ness in the application of the law. The notion of reification, discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 119-73, is based on this drive for fairness.
"' Open-textured terms ("due process") or laws ("no vehicles in the park"), see H.
HART, supra note 67, at 125, present the well-recognized possibility of policy-oriented
interpretation that may be unfair to various parties. Thus, the erection of a stationary
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earlier, for threshold concepts such as property or security, using poli-
cies of the acts to determine entrance into the protective regulatory
scheme often allows judges to disguise a ruling on the merits as a deci-
sion on the existence of triggering entitlements such as property or
security.1 8
III. SECURITY: RES OR NEXUS-OF-COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS?
A concern closely related to the objection against defining threshold
terms in a self-referencing manner is whether one should view a secur-
ity as a reified object (instrument) or as a nexus-of-commercial rela-
tionships."1 9 The more concrete or reified the concept of a security is,
the greater is the necessity of having an existence grounded in sources
outside of the securities acts.' 20 As a result, it is easier to conceive of a
monument in the form of a tank in the park may be considered a "vehicle" in the park
because it presents the dangers that the legislature was concerned about (safety - the
possibility that ballplayers will collide with the monument). Deeming such a stationary
tank a "vehicle" may be considered unfair to the parties since it would have been
difficult to anticipate this decision given the plain meaning of vehicle. Thus, the fair-
ness problems discussed in the text also occur in common law adjudication and statu-
tory interpretation. However, threshold terms such as "security" or "property" that are
designed to give notice of wholesale application of statutory or constitutional schemes
should be defined as tightly and independently (from the goals of the substantive rules)
as possible. This is even more important than in the case of open, substantive rules
such as the one regarding vehicles in the park.
10 The danger is that judges may look at the merits of the case, then make result-
oriented decisions on whether there is an entitlement such as "property" or "security."
In constitutional law, this danger is articulated as the fear that if state judges determine
what constitutes property, then they control constitutional outcomes by their determina-
tion of whether property exists. Thus, a court simply may decide that something no
longer is property, or that certain property always belonged to someone else. Thus, if
the predicate condition is not held to an independent, objective test, then whether a
party has a right to substantive rules can be manipulated by state court recharacteriza-
tions of the predicate condition. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring): "For a State cannot be permitted to defeat the consti-
tutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law by the simple
device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all." See
also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977), affd, 753 F.2d 1468
(9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985) (No. 85-
406). By controlling the predicate condition (definition of a security in terms of the
policies of the acts) the court can control the application of the substantive rules.
11 The phrase "nexus-of-commercial relationships" was inspired by Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (corporation described as "legal fiction
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships").
20 Consider two examples. One is "stock," which is a fairly reified concept. The
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security as having objective, definable characteristics. On the other
hand, if one views a security in a nonreified sense, as a relationship
between persons, then it is more difficult to define its natural character-
istics.1 2' Moreover, the courts are likely to proceed on a case by case
basis to determine whether a relationship creates a security, a process
that inevitably will lead to determinations guided by the policies of the
acts. "' Under the nexus-of-relationship or transaction approach, the
determination of whether a security exists will be based on whether
conduct, as opposed to the use of an instrument, justifies application of
the acts.' 21 Hence, a relationship or transaction approach is likely to
involve the same danger of self-referencing threshold definitions dis-
other is the term "investment contract," which is defined in terms of (1) the investment
of money for profit; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3) with returns solely from the
efforts of others. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. The question of whether an instrument is
stock is proved by comparing its characteristics with the state law description: negotia-
bility, ability to be pledged or hypothecated, having proportionate voting rights, and
ability to appreciate in value. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 851. The nature of the charac-
teristics associated with stock requires one to turn to state law for a definition and
determination of applicability. The definition of investment contract, on the other hand,
requires courts to examine the facts of each transaction on a case by case basis. Invest-
ment contract analysis does not necessitate reference to the characteristics of an invest-
ment contract under state law. This results because investment contract analysis pri-
marily has been viewed a matter of federal common law development. See infra note
125. Furthermore, the elements of an investment contract do not appear to be natural
or inherent qualities of instruments but rather the reflection of policy considerations.
See infra note 133 (discussing the dual-level theory of a security).
121 This is evident in the definition of "investment contract." Two of its three ele-
ments focus on the relationship between investors and other investors, and the investors
and those managing the investment. The second element of the Howey test is whether
there is a common enterprise. A "common enterprise" is a group of investors all pool-
ing their money with a promoter. The third element of the Howey test requires that the
profit derive solely from the efforts of persons other than the investors. See Howey, 328
U.S. at 301. Since the number and kinds of relationships among investors and between
investors and promoters can vary, the test for an investment contract cannot be as neat
and succinct as that for stock.
123 See supra note 121. Investment contract analysis requires a case by case evalua-
tion of the nature of the relationship between the investor and the promoter, and among
the investors. On the other hand, those possessing stock have a security if they can
simply prove the document itself. See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2304 ("There is no need
here [when considering stock], as there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the char-
acteristics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.").
121 It is always more complicated to judge whether the parties' conduct, as opposed
to the characteristics of the instrument, justify a finding of a security. Moreover, judg-
ments of conduct call for greater discovery and involve the possibility of conflicting
testimony. The characteristics of stock, such as negotiability, the right to receive divi-
dends, or right to vote are readily discernible and can be stipulated to by the parties.
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cussed above. 12 4
Under the two-tiered approach, the nexus versus instrument ap-
proach is an issue at both levels. First, there is the question of whether
stocks, bonds, notes, investment contracts, and other first level catego-
ries are reified instruments or transactions. Second, there is the issue of
whether the second tier concept of a security is the description of a
certain kind of instrument or a description of a certain kind of commer-
cial relationship.
Under the suggested two-tiered model, all of the items in level one,
including notes and instruments commonly known as securities, are
treated as instruments. This means that even the nexus-like concept of
an investment contract is treated as a reified instrument. The reason for
treating these items as instruments is that at the time of the adoption of
the securities acts, they commonly were understood under state law to
be instruments. 2 ' Moreover, it is useful within the two-tiered scheme
to consider these items (including investment contracts) state-created in-
struments. Viewing these categories in a reified manner clarifies that
this level represents the referential aspect of the sections that define a
security. 2
6
On the other hand, the second tier, which represents the attributive
aspect of the concept of a security, need not be viewed in a reified man-
ner. While some state-created instruments commonly are known as se-
127 h emicurities, using the term in this sense is different from the use of the
term "security" in the federal acts. As used in the federal acts, the termhas a more specialized meaning than the ordinary usage under state
124 In applying the Howey test (also referred to as "investment contract analysis")
the judge has to determine whether the efforts in the investment enterprise come solely
from the efforts of others. Since this issue often may be a close one, a judge may be
tempted to rule unconsciously on the basis of whether he thinks the ultimate claim is
meritorious. Cases involving multi-level "pyramid" schemes often call for a close deter-
mination as to whether the managerial effort comes solely from the effort of the pro-
moter. See SEC v. Glenn Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
125 In Howey, the Supreme Court referred to investment contracts as a "crystallized"
and uniformly applied concept under state law. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
120 When stocks, notes, bonds, and the like are viewed both as state-created and
reified instruments, much of the open texture is removed from the process of applying
these terms to a particular case. With objective characteristics that are determined by
reference to state law, the determination of whether there is a stock or note becomes
rather mechanical.
M2 See supra note 13. The Supreme Court has held that the meaning of "instrument
commonly known as a security" is the same as that of investment contract. Forman,
421 U.S. at 852.
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law. Other terms in the securities acts also have both lay and special-
ized meanings. For example, the term "underwriter" has an ordinary
meaning but also a more precise meaning when used in the Securities
Act of 1933.28 The specialized use of the term "security" connotes the
circumstances or context justifying the application of the acts. Thus, the
second level attributive concept of a security is transaction based be-
cause it involves certain relationships between parties (concerning
stocks, bonds, notes, or those instruments commonly thought of as se-
curities) that call for the imposition of the acts' substantive rules.1 2
Is there a structure or essence that describes this kind of relationship
between various parties? It often was asserted that the Howey dual-
level theory of a security described the essence of that relationship. 3
The dual-level theory of a security's' describes a situation when an
investor places money with a promoter (first level) who then invests it
in another enterprise.
128 The ordinary lay meaning of "underwriter" refers to investment bankers who act
as middle men in the distribution of newly offered securities. See T. HAZEN, supra
note 3, at 27-28. The Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982),
defines underwriter more specifically, including insiders who sell large blocks of securi-
ties acquired from their corporation in a nonpublic offering. See § 2(11) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982); SEC rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144
(1985); see generally Ira Haupt & Co., 23 SEC 589 (1946) (broker-dealer who sells
under circumstances indicating dispersal of a large amount of shares among the public
held to be an "underwriter").
1 9 Thus, in lay or ordinary usage, the term "security" refers to an instrument com-
monly known as a security. Arguably, the more specialized use of "security" has two
levels. The first is a presumption that all notes, stocks, bonds, and the like, which meet
the characteristics for that category, are securities. The second is an exemptive concept
that would exclude such instruments if the transaction did not justify application of the
securities acts. Terms like "property" and "liberty" arguably have a similar two-step
quality. For example, the first tier of the term "property" may include the familiar
examples: fee simple ownership in land, personalty, and water rights. The second tier,
reflective of the policies relevant to imposing the due process protection, may exclude
certain interests in particular situations. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) ("rep-
utation" alone does not constitute a protected liberty or property interest).
1SO 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
131 See N. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 452-59
(1940), cited in V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 779-83 (2d
ed. 1979).
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investor
I
promoter (first level)
I
enterprise (second level)
The promoter may or may not control the enterprise. In any event, the
investor does not control the enterprise and is dependent on others for a
safe and profitable return. " 2 Since the investor is not in the position as
is the promotor to ascertain the risks of the enterprise, the promoter
should give her full and fair disclosure prior to investment.1 3 As the
basis for the sale of business doctrine, parties seriously argued that the
Howey dual-level theory was the essence of a security."' However,
since Gould and Landreth rejected the sale of business doctrine, it is
evident that the dual-level theory does not describe a security's essential
structure.
1 85
Nevertheless, the rejection of the sale of business doctrine does not
undermine the contention that the concept of a security should be
viewed in nexus-of-relationship or transaction terms." 6 The essential
"' If the investor had substantial control over the investment enterprises she would
have access to the information necessary to evaluate the risks involved. When she is
isolated from control and without sufficient bargaining power to compel disclosure, the
law should require disclosure, either in the form of antifraud rules or registration re-
quirements. Hence, the acts should apply only when the investor relies on a return
solely from the efforts of others. This is the third element of the Howey test. Without it,
no finding of an investment contract and thus a security can stand; neither the an-
tifraud nor the registration rules are activated.
183 The essence of the dual-level theory is that the investor needs disclosure to evalu-
ate the risks that her promoter is taking:
The prospective security buyer is not dealing with the probable returns
from a real capital good whose form and shape he personally supervises.
The problem that confronts him is as follows: How sound is my judgment
of the soundness of the promoters' judgment concerning the probable yield
from the real capital goods that this enterprise proposes to use? What he
really has to do is to appraise the promoters' appraisal of the venture that
they regard as an investment opportunity.
N. BUCHANAN, supra note 131, at 454.
"4 Groen, 687 F.2d 197; Winkler, 673 F.2d 342; Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147.
188 See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297; Gould, 105 S. Ct. 1161.
Although the Supreme Court disposed of a transaction-oriented approach to
stock, it deliberately left open the question whether notes, bonds, or other instruments
would be evaluated on the basis of circumstances surrounding the transaction. "We
here expressly leave until another day the question whether 'notes' or 'bonds' or some
other category of instrument listed in the definition might be shown 'by proving [only]
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registration and exemptive provisions of the 1933 Securities Act treat
securities in a transaction sense.' 37 The Act requires registration of se-
curities transactions." The critical exemptions are framed as transac-
tion exemptions."3 ' Furthermore, the phrase preceding the definition of
a security, "unless the context otherwise requires . . . ," supports a
transaction concept of a security."40 This language implies that if the
transactional circumstances surrounding the use of an instrument do
not warrant application of the acts, the concept of a security operates as
a transaction exemption 4" to exclude the instrument from consideration
as a security much like section 4 of the 1933 Act.' 42
the document itself.'" Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leas-
ing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943)).
187 The term "security" generally connotes a reified instrument. See Securities Act of
1933, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982) (exempting securities). The registration and exemp-
tion sections are not triggered by securities but by securities transactions. In such sec-
tions, the relationship between the parties, not the incidental presence of an instrument
known as a security, determines that section's application. For example, the Supreme
Court in Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, interpreted the transaction exemption for non-
public offerings in terms of the nature of offerees.
138 The Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d) (1982), makes it unlawful
to sell a security unless a registration statement is in effect. Every sale involving a
security must either be registered or exempt from registration. Thus, an initial registra-
tion does not operate as a dog tag to validate the sale of that security into the future.
The application of §§ 4 and 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires one to find an
exemption for every transaction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-e (1982).
189 Section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982), is entitled "Exempted Transactions" and
encompasses the bulk of situations in which securities transactions are exempt. Section
3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982), exempts certain kinds of securities such as government
securities and securities issued by savings and loan associations. Section 3(a)11, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982), although within the section on exempted securities, acts
more like a transaction exemption in that it exempts "any security which is a part of an
issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory .
140 See §§ 2 & 3 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b & 78c (1982) (both
using the language "unless the context otherwise requires . . ").
141 The judicial development of the concept of a security (the second tier) is similar
to judicial interpretations of § 4(2), which exempts otherwise applicable instruments
from the securities acts.
14. Section 4, and particularly § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, provides a means
of developing a judicial common law through which the "context otherwise requires"
the application of the securities acts. For a discussion of judicial "statutory law" in the
interpretation of § 4(2), see generally Note, A Position Paper of the Federal Regula-
tion of Securities Committee, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association, 31 Bus. LAW. 485 (1975).
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A. The Investment Contract as an Instrument
The logical corollary to treating the second-tier concept of a security
as an open, attributive provision is that one must treat the category of
investment contracts as referring to a class of instruments. Indeed, the
two-tiered model treats all first level items, including investment con-
tracts, as instruments. These instruments have characteristics derived
from state law understandings or expectations. While this is obvious in
relation to categories of enumerated instruments such as stock,14 the
so-called catch-all phrase investment contract has always been treated
in a transaction or relationship manner.'44
Historical justification exists for treating investment contracts as in-
struments. The Supreme Court in Howey stated that the term had a
"crystallized" meaning before 1933.'4 Subsequently, lower federal
courts have misinterpreted Howey and sought to make investment con-
tract analysis the attributive, policy-based aspect of the concept of a
security. Their opinions created interpretive difficulties; they threatened
to render superfluous all the enumerated categories in the definition.
Furthermore, using investment contract as a catch-all term led to the
development of the sale of business doctrine. 46 One might interpret the
Supreme Court's rejection of that doctrine as affirming the referential,
as opposed to catch-all or attributive, use of the term "investment
contract.'
14 7
The federal common law puts such a heavy gloss on the term "in-
vestment contract" that courts may have difficulty returning investment
contracts to the category of instruments created and defined by state
law. Investment contract analysis has been viewed as a question of fed-
141 See generally Gould, 105 S. Ct. at 2308; Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2297.
144 Indeed, the "flora and fauna" securities cases have been brought largely on the
basis of investment contract analysis (which focuses on the relationship between the
parties and manner of offering). See generally Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (orange groves);
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (distribution of cos-
metics); Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968) (beavers); SEC v. Tung Corp. of America, 32 F. Supp.
371 (N.D. Ill. 1940) (tung trees). Transactional elements, such as the manner of offer-
ing, have usually determined whether real estate interests such as rental pool arrange-
ments, timesharing interests, or condominiums are investment contracts. See Guidelines
as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condo-
miniums or Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 5347
Uan. 4, 1973).
146 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
146 See supra text accompanying notes 16-28.
47 See supra note 83.
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eral law with little reference to its state law origins. For example,
while reference to the original state law concept should answer the
question of whether horizontal commonality14 is required, the lower
federal courts have used the policies of the acts for guidance. 49
Fortunately, most interpretations of the term "investment contract"
have resembled the original definition. 50 The policy concerns that have
gone into investment contract analysis are more appropriately addressed
in fashioning the proper concept of a security. For example, the notion
of vertical commonality1 51 which has been urged by some lower courts
should not be forced upon the Howey test as an awkward modifica-
tion.1 52 Rather, the policies behind the adoption of vertical commonality
should be employed at the second tier level of the concept of a
security. 53
14 "Horizontal commonality" refers to an interpretation of the common enterprises
requirement of the Howey test. Courts applying horizontal commonality require at least
two investors who pool money and invest it with a promoter. "Vertical commonality"
refers to courts not requiring more than one investor "at the same level." Such courts
find sufficient "common enterprise" if the promoter and investor have a common inter-
est in seeking a profit. See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir.
1977) (requiring horizontal commonality); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457
F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (finding horizontal commonality
absent in the case of discretionary trading accounts and thus holding that no security
was involved). But see Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa
1974) (holding horizontal commonality not required and vertical commonality sufficient
in a case involving discretionary trading accounts).
140 Hirk, 561 F.2d 96.
150 The only areas of interpretive difficulty have been the common enterprise re-
quirement, see supra note 148, and whether the requirement that the efforts be "solely
from the efforts of others" can be construed as "substantially from the efforts of
others." Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (relaxing the requirement that efforts
come "solely" from the efforts of others).
18 See supra note 148.
162 The court in Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. at 489, argued that the Supreme Court
in Howey never intended to require horizontal commonality.
"a Under the two-tier test, the state-generated description of investment contract
should apply. If that definition requires horizontal commonality, then an arrangement
that allegedly is an investment contract must meet that qualification. Hence, as to in-
vestment contracts, the horizontal-vertical commonality issue would be dead. No ar-
rangement lacking horizontal commonality would survive the first level test; thus, the
second tier concept could not be used to reintroduce such arrangements at the second
level. However, this is a completely different question than whether notes should re-
quire horizontal commonality. The resolution of that issue (as to investment contracts)
has no bearing on whether notes that demonstrate only vertical commonality could be
securities.
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B. Stocks, Bonds, Notes as Instruments: Which Law Governs?
Under the two-tiered model, the first level instrument categories are
to be defined by state law. To determine whether a particular type of
stock is truly stock, the court must decide whether to look to the specific
law of the state of incorporation or to state law in general.'" A sensible
answer is that the drafters used these terms in an indexical manner.155
By use of the term "stock," they did not mean stock as defined by the
particular corporation statute of the state of incorporation. Rather, they
used the term to fix a reference to a paradigm of stock.15 For example,
to "fix the reference"15 7 of water one might point at a glass of clear
liquid and say, "by 'water,' I mean that stuff there." If the liquid
15 In Landreth, the Supreme Court did not look to the law of the state of incorpo-
ration (Washington) to determine whether the stock would be considered stock. The
Court has never intimated that the law of the state of incorporation governs. The lan-
guage quoted in Forman refers to characteristics "typically associated with common
stock." Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2302. Indeed, state statutes do not define what they
mean by stock in a relevant manner. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANNOT. § 1.40(21) (West 1982) (defining "share" as
follows: "the unit into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are divided.").
"' This Article uses "indexical" in the sense of "to serve to indicate." Thus, by the
term "stock" the drafters of these definitional sections were using the word as if point-
ing to a common type of stock. They had in their minds a paradigm concept of a stock
that had all the usual characteristics. See generally Putnam, Meaning and Reference,
70 J. PHIL. 699, 711 (1973) (emphasis in original):
We have now seen that the extension of a term is not fixed by a concept
that the individual speaker has in his head, and this is true both because
extension is, in general, determined socially - there is division of linguis-
tic labor as much as of "real" labor - and because extension is, in part,
determined indexically. The extension of our terms depends upon the ac-
tual nature of the particular things that serve as paradigms, and this ac-
tual nature is not, in general, fully known to the speaker.
156 At least the Supreme Court thinks so. See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306 (citing
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1983) ("First, traditional stock 'repre-
sents to many people, both trained and untrained in business matters, the paradigm of
security'. ... ).
157 To "fix a reference" is to use a term in an indexical manner. Schwartz describes
it as follows:
When we introduce the term it is not necessary that we know the nature
of the stuff we are naming. We hope that such knowledge will come with
empirical scientific investigations. The term, once introduced, can be
handed on from person to person in the referential chain, maintaining its
original reference at each link. Putnam calls a term that is introduced by
means of a paradigm and is meant to refer to whatever has the same un-
derlying nature as the paradigm "an indexical term."
NAMING, NECESSITY, supra note 44, at 33.
19861
University of California, Davis
turned out to be hydrochloric acid, the speaker was not intending to say
that hydrochloric acid was water. 5 By pointing, the speaker was "fix-
ing a reference." Whether or not the stuff in the glass was really water,
the speaker's intent was to refer to the real thing, water." 9
Similarly, the terms "stock," "note," and the like were meant to fix a
reference to the real things, stock, bonds, notes, and the like. The real
essence of stock can be garnered from general understandings and ex-
pectations. For example, if the issue were whether nonvoting stock
were stock for the purpose of the securities acts, 6 ' the law of the state
of incorporation would not solely control. Rather, general understand-
ings and the proper usage of the word "stock" would prevail. 6 '
1" Id.
9 Real water has the scientific structure of real water. See Putnam, The Meaning
of Meaning, in 2 H. PUTNAM, MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY PHILOSOPHICAL PA-
PERS 238-41 (1975).
160 Nonvoting stock is considered stock for most other corporate purposes. More in-
teresting questions would be raised over stock that had no proprietary rights. Would
stock that had no right to receive dividends or to receive assets upon dissolution be
deemed not to constitute stock for the purposes of the securities acts? Reference to the
law of state of incorporation generally has been inconclusive. State law does not define
stock and does not prohibit the existence of nonproprietary stock. See Lehrman v. Co-
hen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966) (class of stock that did not receive dividends
held not violative of state law); see also Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 Il1. 2d
471, 272 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1971) (Schaefer, J., dissenting):
What remains, then [of stock with no right to dividends or rights on disso-
lution], is a disembodied right to manage the assets of a corporation, di-
vorced from any financial interest in those assets except such as may ac-
crue from the power to manage them. In my opinion, what is left after the
economic rights are "removed and eliminated" is not a share of corporate
stock under the law of Illinois.
'' To fix a reference by use of the paradigm of stock without basing such a para-
digm on any particular state statute is essentially to "know it" when one "sees it." Two
factors lead to this result. First, state statutes and decisional law do not routinely define
"stock" in any particular manner. The terms "stock" and "shares" are used in state
statutes as if there is a common, acceptable paradigm meaning to these words. Second,
it is common to use terms in this indexical or paradigmatic fashion. We use the term
"atom" sensibly without having a concrete understanding of an atom's structure. More-
over, we use words such as "dreaming" and "pain" with complete confidence that ev-
eryone understands what we mean even though we do not fully understand the scien-
tific aspects of these phenomena. The same can be said of "stock." See generally
NAMING AND NECESSITY, supra note 44.
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C. The Utility of Reification
One might ask what difference it makes if items such as stocks and
notes are deemed reified objects or labels for types of relationships. 16'2
Both seem to describe the same phenomena."l 3 Nevertheless, reification
has a certain utility that is worth preserving in the securities acts. Rei-
fication allows complex patterns of legal relationships with attendant
consequences to be simplified into mental economies.' 4 Moreover, the
reification of relationships into instruments facilitates a continuity of
legal results across time.
As an illustration, one might examine the concept of a pawn.'6 5 A
pawn may either be instrument-like, as the physical symbol of a con-
cept, or it may be a mental economy that stands for a number of differ-
162 See W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 98 (1980):
Reification is a useful device; it allows us to manage complexity .... In
law, the idea of the separate entity serves the further, more mundane,
function of symbolizing a set of important legal rules or doctrines, such as
limited liability of shareholders. . . . When the entity theory leads to bad
results, the courts often find ways to avoid or ignore it. Still, reification is
a device for making something that is in fact complex seem simple, and
that can be dangerous.
It is not profitable to ask whether the real nature of a security is that of an
instrument or whether it is the symbol for a set of relationships as a corporation may
be. The way that we commonly talk about securities seems to indicate that it is an
instrument. If one feels that to understand a word is to know how to use it correctly, it
seems that "security" has a reified nature, just as a corporation does. However, the
term "security" is treated as a concept as often as it is treated as a res. Since it is of a
conceptual nature, similar to a "corporation," the nature of a security is whatever we
deem it is. But if we are looking to find res-type characteristics we will find such
characteristics. If we seek to view it as a set of relationships, then, we find it to be a set
of relationships. The res versus aggregation-of-relationships nature of a security, like
that of a corporation, depends on the purpose of the inquiry. This is shown by the
history of the doctrines allowing disregard of the corporate entity. See generally Hamil-
ton, supra note 88. The historical tension between the aggregate versus entity theory in
partnership law also demonstrates of the dual nature of reified entities in law. See
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121' (1958); Jensen, Is a Partnership
Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV.
377 (1963). See also F. CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 56 (1975) (the dual wave/
particle nature of light).
'" See supra note 162. The term "mental economy" or "economy of thought" has
been attributed to the physicist Ernst Mach. See N. CAMPBELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
SCIENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEORY AND EXPERIMENT 222 (1957) (in Mach's
view, "the object of science is to attain 'economy of thought.' ").
165 See generally Snare, The Concept of Property, 9 AM. PHIL. Q. 200 (1972). Snare
makes the point that things like property or a pawn are defined by the contextual rules
that create their existence.
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ent rules in the game of chess.'66 The physical, reified pawn is useful
because it reminds us that all pawns have the same powers and that
pawns can make only specific moves at any stage of the game. Thus,
reification enables the players to feel relatively certain about the conse-
quences of moving a piece.
Stock is like a pawn. It stands for or is a mental economy for a
number of different possible moves within the "corporate game." Stock
can be bought, sold, pledged, hypothecated, or split. Having stock en-
ables a player to make a variety of moves such as receiving dividends,
or voting for the election of directors, for merger, for consolidation, or
for the dissolution of the corporation. The utility of the reification of
stock is that to have stock is an indication of all of these possible moves.
Moreover, one who has stock assumes that similar consequences will
attach to certain moves regardless of the point in time in the game. The
purchase or sale of stock should have the same legal consequences
whether it is done today or next month. In other words, the stock still
should be stock a month from now.' 67 Anything that detracts from this
general uniformity of consequences across time detracts from the fair-
ness of the game.'6 " If players can change the rules at any time, the
game is unfair; the players would become hesitant about their moves.' 9
If the consequences of making a move or the powers associated with
"' For example, pawns are allowed to move straight ahead, one space at a time,
except for the first move in which, if unobstructed, they are allowed to move two
spaces. Pawns are allowed to capture other enemy pieces that are diagonally ahead of
them. These rules and others, including the rules that define what other pieces can do
vis-a-vis pawns, define "pawn."
"67 One of the arguments against the adoption of the sale of business doctrine was
that stock would be considered a security under some circumstances (purchases of less
than 50%) but not in other circumstances (purchase of a controlling interest).
"" Problems of fairness and reliance inevitably are raised when a reified entity is
deconstructed due to circumstances surrounding the transaction. For example, in
"piercing the corporate veil" a corporation that would have all normal attributes of a
corporation, such as limited liability, is denied its "corporateness" for policy reasons.
Another example is the recharacterization of debt as equity in either the corporate or
tax context. See Obre v. Alban Tractor Co., 228 Md. 291, 179 A.2d 861 (1962) (ma-
jority shareholder's debt characterized as equity by court below for tax purposes).
Changing the rules or powers of reified instruments or entities (such as corporations)
undermines the concept of having reified entities. Instead, parties become accustomed to
the notion that the rules are determined on a case by case basis.
9 For example, the development of the doctrine allowing disregard of the corporate
entity, even when the shareholders have taken all the necessary steps to form a corpora-
tion, creates uncertainty as to when shareholders may rely on limited liability. The
more deconstruction of the entity, the more uncertain and hesitant shareholders become
to form corporations with minimal capitalization.
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stock changed depending on the stage of the game or the situation one
was in (even according to preexisting rules) the game would become
very complex. 170 This would make the game unfair and require that
only the extremely sophisticated participate.17 1
The sale of business doctrine was a rule that changed the powers of
stock depending on the circumstances of the transaction. Thus, in the
same sense that an imagined rule might make a queen a pawn depend-
ing upon what pieces surrounded it, stock was not always stock. Under
the sale of business doctrine, stock was not stock (for the purposes of
the securities acts) when a controlling block of stock was sold.17 Conse-
quently, players could not determine in advance when the doctrine
would apply, making the doctrine too disruptive of the game, and thus
unfair. '73
Hence, the importance of maintaining the instrument-like or reified
nature of stocks, bonds, and the like lies in retaining fairness in the
corporate game. Those who manipulate these instruments are aware in
advance whether moves made with stock or notes will trigger the appli-
cation of the securities acts. Preserving the instrument quality of these
items signals that the same consequences will result throughout the
170 The complexity of games that vary the powers of pieces depending on the point
in the game and the circumstances surrounding the piece is illustrated by modern battle
strategy games such as D-Day and Panzer Leader (Avalon Hill).
17 Legal "games" (securities, corporations, or tax) with extremely complicated rules
require lay persons to employ experts to assist them with the rules. This makes access
to such games only available to persons with substantial financial resources. Moreover,
investor suitability rules, often designed to protect the investor by allowing only those
who are rich or smart to participate, see supra note 95, help the rich to get richer while
the middle class maintains its status. Often, the complexity that justifies excluding those
lacking sophistication is without basis. Such complexity is magnified by the mystical
use of concepts such as "corporation" and "security."
17' The basis of the sale of business doctrine was that the substance of the transac-
tion, namely acquisition of assets, should not be overshadowed by the form of the trans-
action, the purchase of stock. See Gould, 105 S. Ct. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I
do not believe Congress intended the federal securities laws to govern the private sale of
a substantial ownership interest in these operating businesses simply because the trans-
actions were structured as sales of stock instead of assets.").
I7s Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2307:
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale of business
doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in which less than 100% of
a company's stock was sold. This inevitably would lead to difficult ques-
tions of line drawing . . . . [Cloverage by the Acts would in most cases be
unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold.
These uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would hardly be
in the best interests of either party to a transaction.
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game. As in the case of the objection against self-referencing definitions,
this advance knowledge of consequences is a critical element of fairness
in the application of the securities acts.
IV. A REVISIONIST VIEW FROM Howey TO Landreth: THE Two-
TIERED TEST
The two-tiered test is a convenient vehicle for reconciling the diverse
approaches the Supreme Court has taken in recent cases. 17 4 One way to
view this apparent fit is that the concerns about reference to state-cre-
ated instruments and reification reflect forces in the application of the
acts that have pushed the Court towards an intuitive, if unarticulated,
resort to a two-tiered approach.
The first notable decision is SEC v. Howey.17 5 Howey generally is
considered the most critical Supreme Court decision defining a security.
Many courts have assumed that the three-part Howey test sets forth the
economic realities or essential structure of a security.1' However,
under the two-tiered approach, Howey is not a decision defining "secur-
ity" but an application of "investment contract," a term originally de-
fined by state law.
In Howey the Court acknowledged this state law background for in-
vestment contracts when it stated, "The term 'investment contract' is
undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant legislative reports. But
the term was common in many 'blue sky' laws in existence prior to the
adoption of the federal statute . . . ." The Court also noted that the
meaning of the term "had been crystallized" even prior to state blue
sky interpretation.1 78 A broad catch-all phrase generally is not consid-
ered a term that has a crystallized meaning.'1 9 Thus, investment con-
tract should connote more a class of instruments whose meaning derives
from nonfederal understandings and expectations.'" 0
Subsequent to Howey, many courts have viewed the investment con-
tract test as federal in nature.' Instead, Howey should be viewed as
174 See supra note 9.
176 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
176 Courts adopting the sale of business doctrine argued that the Howey test consti-
tutes the economic reality of a security. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 134.
77 328 U.S. at 298.
178 Id.
179 See, e.g., id.
180 See State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938
(1920).
181 For example, the courts that have considered the issue of modifying the third
element of the Howey test (solely from the efforts of others) or the common enterprise
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the incorporation of a state law term, to be given its state law mean-
ing."' As noted previously, terms such as "stock" and "investment con-
tract" should find consistent definition by reference to state law.18 3
Within the framework of the two-tiered model, the issue in Howey is
the proper interpretation of "investment contract," the state law term,
not the interpretation of "security."
Second in importance to Howey is the decision in United Housing
Foundation v. Forman.8 Forman has been the source of differing
interpretations of definitional section 2(1).185 This is because Forman
used two-step, disjunctional reasoning. 8 The issue in Forman was
whether shares in a publicly financed housing cooperative were securi-
ties for the purpose of the federal acts. The Court first held that the
"shares" did not fall within the category stock as that term is generally
understood under state law. Second, the Court held that the shares did
not fall within the investment contracts category.
Under the two-tiered approach both "stock" and "investment con-
tract" are classes of instruments defined by legally created expectations
and understanding. For an instrument to qualify as a security it first
must fall within the class of instruments on the first level. Plaintiffs
argued that the instruments were either stock or investment contracts.
The Supreme Court held that neither category applied.1 87 Since estab-
lishing inclusion within any category satisfies the first level require-
requirement have noted the relevance of state cases interpreting the term "investment
contract," but have not indicated an obligation to apply the original state law definition.
See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977) (requiring horizontal
commonality but not discussing relevance of state law); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner En-
ters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973) ("solely from the efforts of others" modified by
federal court). But see Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa
1974) (indicating relevance of state law).
' As in the case of "stock," the term "investment contract" would be interpreted by
reference to its paradigm cases. See supra notes 154-55. Thus, the law of the situs of
the investment contract does not govern.
1S See supra note 182.
18 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
185 Litigants have argued that the Forman decision supports both the adoption and
rejection of the sale of business doctrine. See, e.g., Daily, 701 F.2d at 498 ("Using
sophisticated cut-and-paste techniques, both sides argue that we are bound by [For-
man, 421 U.S. 837]"). The plaintiffs in Daily argued that if the stock meets all ordi-
nary qualifications for stock and is used in the transaction, then the stock should be
deemed a security. The defendants in Daily argued that the three-part Howey test
should apply to all securities. Thus, stock that did not fit within the Howey test was not
a security.
188 421 U.S. at 852.
187 Id. at 848-52.
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ment, the plaintiffs logically argued in the alternative. Thus, the Su-
preme Court had to examine inclusion in both categories.1 8 8 Hence, one
should not view the Court's two-part opinion as implying a two step
catch-all approach, under which one looks first to the enumerated clas-
ses and then (failing there), examines the catch-all phrase for
inclusion.189
If Forman is two step in nature, it is because the test allows the
evaluation of a number of different categories of the same level. For
example, Forman easily may have involved four steps if the plaintiffs
had argued that the shares were (1) stock, (2) investment contracts, (3)
instruments commonly known as securities, or (4) certificates of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement. Moreover, one ar-
rangement or instrument may fit more than one class. Consider the case
of hybrid stock that has a mixture of debt and equity characteristics.' 9
Plaintiffs may argue that such instruments are (1) notes, (2) stock, (3)
treasury stock (if held by the issuer), (4) bonds, (5) debentures, (6)
evidences of indebtedness, (7) investment contracts, or (8) instruments
commonly known as securities. Thus, the two-step nature of Forman
does not indicate two different tiers or levels of analysis. It reflects the
possible number of classes into which instruments may fall. Seen in this
light, Forman merely applies two first level categories. However, since
the plaintiffs failed at the first level, the Court in Forman did not rule
on what constitutes the concept of a security.
Forman strongly reinforces the notion that investment contract is not
a residual catch-all phrase."1" While language in Forman implies that
18 Id. at 851.
1s' Those arguing against the application of the sale of business doctrine urged that
this was the proper interpretation of Howey. See Daily, 701 F.2d at 498-500. However,
under this interpretation, some notes that failed the test for notes might be included as
investment contracts. The probable legislative intent, however, was that these categories
should be read together and not in a manner that allows one category to undermine
another.
'90 Hybrid stock is issued for the purpose of allowing shareholders to have the man-
agerial control associated with stock but the tax advantages of debt. See generally Slap-
pey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1977); Estate of Mixon
v. United States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 author-
ized the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to prescribe regulations on whether to treat
debt as stock. See 26 C.F.R. § 385-1 (1983).
'9" While the Supreme Court in Howey stated that the concept of an investment
contract should be applied flexibly, 328 U.S. at 299, other courts have viewed the
phrase and its equivalent "instrument commonly known as a security" as a catch-all
term, implying that the judge is relatively free to find an investment contract when she
sees fit. See Groen, 687 F.2d at 200.
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investment contract applies flexibly, 192 Forman is more consistent with
the two-tiered model's treatment of investment contracts as a stock-like
category.
Tcherepnin v. Knight' also strongly suggests that the two-tiered
structure may be inherent in sections 2(1) and 3(a)(10). The issue in
Tcherepnin was whether withdrawable capital shares in a state savings
and loan association constituted securities for the purposes of Securities
Exchange Act section 3(a)(10). The shares conferred a right to vote and
to receive dividends from profits at the board's discretion.
The Tcherepnin Court acknowledged the instrument quality of the
class of items on the first level. The Court found these capital shares
were most similar to investment contracts, but also fit within other cate-
gories such as certificates of interest or participation in any profit-shar-
ing arrangement, stock, and transferable share.'" The Court found no
reason to exempt these shares from treatment as securities and held the
securities acts applicable. 9 The Court discussed the House Committee
testimony which indicated a possible intent to exclude such shares from
coverage. 196 However, the Court refused to find this evidence disposi-
tive. Under the two-tiered approach, such evidence would go to second
level considerations - the exemptive qualities of the concept of a secur-
ity. Hence, Tcherepnin fits within the notion that the first level encom-
passes instruments of equal dignity. Furthermore, like Howey, the hold-
ing of Tcherepnin does not define the exemptive concept of a security.
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,197 the Supreme Court started to explore
the contours of the concept of a security. In Marine Bank, an individ-
ual pledged a six-year certificate of deposit (CD) to guarantee a loan to
a third party in connection with a profit-sharing agreement. Instead of
focusing on whether the withdrawable capital shares in Tcherepnin
were instruments, the Marine Bank Court analyzed whether the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction would justify not treating the
instrument as a security.
Under the suggested two-tiered approach, one first must find an ap-
propriate instrument such as stock or a note. Subsequently, the concept
of a security can exempt an instrument for contextual reasons. In
Marine Bank, the Supreme Court held that whether or not the CD fell
192 421 U.S. at 852.
193 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
194 Id. at 339.
198 Id.
9 Id. at 340-41.
455 U.S. 551 (1982).
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within a first tier category, it failed because the second tier concept of a
security excluded it for policy reasons. Under the two-tier test, a court
need not rule on the first level if second level considerations would ex-
clude the instrument. Because the Court skipped the first level and
ruled on the second, one should view its ruling as a ruling on the con-
cept of a security.
Addressing the first level, the lower court in Marine Bank held that
CD's fell within several of the first level categories. The lower court
held that the CD was functionally equivalent to the shares in Tcher-
epnin. Alternatively, the lower court held that the CD fell into either
the class of long-term debt obligations, (presumedly meaning the class
of bonds and debentures) or the class of evidence of indebtedness.
The Supreme Court in Marine Bank held that the lower court was
wrong on both theories. First, the Court stated that the CD was not
like stock because it paid a fixed rate of return while stock received
dividends that varied, depending on profit.' Moreover, purchasers of
capital shares received voting rights.' 9 Second, the Court stated that
CD's are different from other long-term debt obligations because the
FDIC insures them. 00 CD's are also comprehensively regulated
through rules governing the banking industry.
2 0
'
This reasoning raises the issue of whether the Court was excluding
CD's for first or second level reasons. The Court stated that a CD is
different from other long-term debt instruments because there is no risk
factor. One must ask whether the lack of risk is an objective character-
istic of the kind of long-term debt that constitutes the first tier category
or whether lack of risk is part of the essence of a security, thus repre-
senting a second level exclusion. To determine whether the exclusion
occurred at the first or second level, the question is whether the defeat-
ing consideration (the lack of risk because of federal guarantee) is an
element that defines long-term debt securities. If not, then it is a policy
consideration being introduced as part of the definition of a security.
Thus, whether an asserted instrument is excluded at the first or second
level is not an arbitrary determination. Exclusion from the risk level is
determined by reference to the state law that defines the classes of in-
struments at the first level. The elements that define these instruments
do not express policy considerations applicable to the federal securities
acts. Rather, they express the natural characteristics of the instruments
lBS Id. at 557.
'' Id.
200 Id. at 558.
201 Id.
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such as the right to receive dividends and the right to vote. 202
Hence, in Marine Bank, one must inquire whether the lack of risk is
similar to the right to vote or the fixed rate of return. State law deter-
mines if this is an element in the description of that class. While the
question is difficult, 0 3 lack of risk appears to be a policy concern and
not an element in the description of the class. For example, long-term
notes with very little risk, such as first lien mortgage bonds, neverthe-
less may be considered the paradigm of a security. Moreover, in this
particular case, the lack of risk is not inherent in the instrument itself
but is imposed by external sources in the form of a federal guarantee.
This factor strongly indicates that lack of risk is not an element of the
instrument. Hence, Marine Bank should be viewed as excluding CD's
for policy reasons. As such, it constitutes a second level decision, giving
content to the concept of a security.
In the second part of Marine Bank, the Court analyzed whether the
profit-sharing agreement between the parties was a security.'"' The
Court's analysis, including its discussion of the lower court's decision,
could be restructured to fall within the two-tiered model as follows: 1)
The profit-sharing agreement might fit within the classes of instru-
ments either of investment contract or certificate of participation in any
profit-sharing agreement (level one);'0 5 2) The lower court found it
was an investment contract (level two);' 06 3) The lower court found no
reason to exclude the investment contract on the ground that it did not
fit within the meaning of "security";' °  4) The Supreme Court found
that the negotiated agreement did not fall within the ordinary concept
of a security because it was not publicly offered or traded, was unique,
and was negotiated one-on-one by the parties. 0 OAgain, there are two
versions of what the Court did:
202 It is difficult to determine the inherent characteristics associated with the com-
monly understood concept of stock. The term "stock" is not a natural kind term like
"water," "gold," or "tiger." Such natural kind terms can be said to have a scientific
structure. For example, the structure of water is H20. Some philosophers have argued
that nonnatural terms such as "pencil" can have a structure like "water." See Putnam,
supra note 66, at 242-45. For a judge interpreting the federal securities laws, "stock"
can be viewed as a natural kind term if she simply accepts the characteristics associated
with stock as if they were natural.
203 See supra note 202.
204 455 U.S. at 559.
205 Id.
208 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 560.
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First Version: The Supreme Court held that the agreement was not
an investment contract and thus failed to fall within a class of level one
instruments because it failed the common enterprise2'0 requirement of
the investment contract test. The agreement was unique, not publicly
offered, and negotiated one-on-one. The Court did not discuss whether
the agreement fell within the level one class of certificate or participa-
tion in any profit-sharing agreement. Its judgment, however, implies
that it ruled against the plaintiffs on that issue."10
Second Version: The Supreme Court did not address the issue of
whether the agreement was an investment contract. It held that even if
the instrument were an investment contract, the uniqueness of the ar-
rangement and its one-on-one negotiation took the agreement outside
the concept of a security. The Court did not discuss whether the agree-
ment was a certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement. However, this version implies that even if the agreement fell
within this class it would be excluded at the second level because it was
not within the concept of a security."'
Determining which version is correct is important because each has
different ramifications for future interpretation.
Ramifications of Version One: The Supreme Court reinterpreted its
decision in Howey and set forth a requirement of horizontal commonal-
ity. 2 Under this version the decision did not involve the second level
concept of a security.
Ramifications of Version Two: The Court left intact the Howey in-
terpretation of common enterprise but gave information about the con-
tours of the concept of a security. The second version implies that in
circumstances like these, involving a pledge to secure a profit-sharing
agreement and a one-on-one negotiated agreement, the context of the
transaction disqualifies the arrangement as a security.
The test of which is the correct version is whether the definition of
"investment contract," under state law sources, requires horizontal
" The Court held that there was no investment contract because the arrangement
lacked horizontal commonality. See supra note 148.
210 Since the Court ruled against the plaintiffs, their argument that the agreement
was also a profit-sharing arrangement must have failed either for first level (not within
the category) or second level (excluded for policy reasons) considerations.
2" Arguably, an assertion that there was a profit-sharing arrangement would fail
for the same policy reasons as did the argument for consideration as an investment
contract: it was negotiated on a one-on-one basis.
2" See supra note 148.
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commonality. The problem is that state law rarely considers commonal-
ity. Federal courts have conducted most of the discussion of commonal-
ity. In so doing, federal courts have not sought to follow state laws, but
instead have focused on policies appropriate to the federal securities
acts.2 3
Further problems lie in the difference between the nature of the ele-
ments of an investment contract and those that define other classes such
as stock (including the right to vote and dividends). Even under state
law, the definitions of other classes probably were intended to be flexi-
ble and policy oriented. Therefore, it is much more difficult to deter-
mine whether the horizontal commonality requirement is inherent to
the instrument itself (like the redness of an apple or the dividend pay-
ing aspects of stock) or is a consideration imposed upon the instrument
for policy reasons.2""
Given Marine Bank's language, "does not fall within the ordinary
concept of a security," and the way the Court cited cases such as
Howey, Joiner, and Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, the Marine
Bank decision seems to fit more properly into the second version (level
two exclusion).216 This interpretation is also less disruptive. Under the
first version one would have to reinterpret Howey as requiring horizon-
tal commonality in investment contracts.
As can be seen, the two-tiered approach generates a more precise
method for determining the holding of cases interpreting sections 2(1)
and 3(a)(10). Thus, as in Marine Bank, a court examining an instru-
ment might avoid a first level determination. The court then would
proceed to hold that even if the arrangement fell within any of the first
level classes of instruments, the instrument nevertheless would not be a
security for policy reasons. The holding of the case would center on the
concept of a security, immune to inference about whether the instru-
ment would have fallen within any level one categories.
On the other hand, the court could decide that the arrangement did
213 See supra note 181.
214 See supra note 202.
215 455 U.S. at 559-60. In citing Howey, the Court in Marine Bank emphasized that
the securities in Howey were offered to a large number of investors (42 persons in a
four month period). The Court cited the decision in Joiner, 320 U.S. 344 as one in
which there was "common trading." In the Great Western decision, 532 F.2d 1252, in
which there was no finding of a security,ithe Ninth Circuit based its decision, in part,
on the fact that the note was negotiated one to one. Thus, the Court in Marine Bank
was focusing on whether the transaction was public or private. Given that the nature of
the transaction was the critical issue, the defeating consideration should be viewed as a
second level policy concern.
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not fall within a class of instruments because certain essential charac-
teristics were missing; the court then would give reasons that would
exclude it from the definition of a security. In this instance, the holding
focuses only on the first level. The ruling on the concept of a security is
dictum.2 6 This latter reasoning fits the Court's decision in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.17
In Daniel, pension interests were asserted to be investment contracts.
Because the Court found that the nonvoluntary, noncontributory pen-
sion interests did not meet the first part of the Howey test, requiring the
investment of money, the Court discounted this assertion.21
In Part IV, the Court added that since ERISA antifraud provisions
apply to these interests, the petitioner did not need securities act protec-
tion.2 ' 9 This part of the Court's discussion introduced elements relevant
only to the second level concept of a security. Moreover, under the two-
tiered analysis, these statements were dicta since an adequate basis for
exclusion existed at the first level.
Understandably, decisions such as Daniel examine policy grounds
for defining a security. They are reminiscent of other Supreme Court
decisions that focus on standing to sue or causes of action implied under
the securities acts. For example, the Court's standing decisions in Piper
v. Chris-Craft2 2 0 and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,22 1 and
its decision regarding implied causes of action in Touche Ross v. Red-
ington22 ' express a mixture of concerns for policy and fidelity to legis-
lative intent similar to Marine Bank223 and Daniel.2 4 Decisions defin-
ing the scope of the term "security" are similar to standing and implied
cause of action decisions because each case has the potential to expand
securities law to protect whole new classes of interests. An affirmative
decision in Daniel, for example, would have "implied" a new "cause of
action" for antifraud suits based on noncontributory pension interests.
In other words, Daniel potentially would have created standing for a
new class of plaintiffs.2"" Thus, not surprisingly, similar policy con-
16 Although it is dictum, it may be equally predictive of the Court's view about the
nature of the concept of security.
217 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
"I6 Id. at 559.
219 Id. at 569.
220 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
Si 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
2 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
228 455 U.S. 551.
224 439 U.S. 551.
2-5 Each decision that expands the concept of a security to a class of interests, such
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cerns apply to all three types of cases.
Finally, fitting Gould226 and Landreth227 within the two-tiered
framework is quite easy. In both cases the first level requirement was
met because the stock in question clearly fell within a first level cate-
gory. 2 8 In addition, neither case called for exclusion from the concept
of a security on policy grounds. Moreover, the Court strongly implied
that all stock transactions would involve a security.22 9
Thus, Gould and Landreth provide a holding both on level one and
two. As to level one, these particular stocks fell within the category of
stock. As to the second level, the Court implied that the concept of a
security would not exempt stock. However, the Court was not willing
to extend this conclusion to other categories such as notes. This implies
that the concept of a security does not apply in the same manner to
stock and notes, and that the concept is not a simple structure consisting
of a conjunction of characteristics. 3 '
The two-tiered model is advantageous because the different treat-
ment of stock and notes under a one-tiered test is difficult to explain.
The two-tiered model can represent a complexly structured concept in
place of seemingly inconsistent treatment for similar categories. The
next section explores the possibility of a complex structure and whether
there is an original concept of this structure that courts should address.
V. THE CONCEPT OF A SECURITY AND PROCESS AS ADHERENCE
TO ORIGINAL INTENT
As demonstrated above, the appeal of the two-tiered approach is its
ability to reconcile the Supreme Court's apparently diverse approaches
to defining a security. Moreover, while the approach logically addresses
a concern inherent in such threshold provisions, namely, the need to
refer to instruments outside the statute, the model also allows the term
to have a meaning that comports with the statute's goals.
However, while the two-tiered approach lends reliable meaning to
the first level (instruments that fit within the classes such as stock and
note must be included) the model leaves considerable uncertainty about
the description of the concept of a security in its second level. A few
as pension interests or limited partnerships, has an effect similar to creating a new
cause of action.
126 105 S. Ct. 2308.
227 105 S. Ct. 2297.
"~ Gould, 105 S. Ct. at 2310; Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2304.
's See Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 2306 (stock is the paradigm of a security).
So See supra note 66.
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things can be inferred about the second level concept. For example,
Gould and Landreth imply that the elements of the test for a security
are not simply the three elements of the Howey test. 3' Moreover, dicta
from Marine Bank and Daniel suggest that instruments will be ex-
cluded at the second level if substantial policy reasons exist. For exam-
ple, other statutes may provide sufficient antifraud coverage. 232
Other important questions remain concerning the concept of a secur-
ity. First, are the elements of a security conjunctive in nature? Or, is
there a cluster of elements from which a number can be selected to
form the essence of a security?2"3 Second, if the concept of a security is
cluster-like, how can future judges fulfill their obligation to legislative
intent when there is no clear, original conception of a security? This
Article suggests the following answers. First, the structure of a security
is not conjunctive, but instead is cluster-like in character. Second, the
drafters of the provisions defining a security had no specific description
or conception in mind. Rather, because the term is attributive in part,
they had a more general concept in mind. This Article argues that
when legal concepts are cluster-like, courts can fulfill their obligation to
the original legislative concept by an interpretive process that produces
successive conceptions.23 4 When a term is designed to be essentially at-
tributive but not completely open-ended, legislative intent is fulfilled by
a process of asking the right questions. This process produces successive
differing conceptions of a security that are unified by a single concept
much as superimposed still pictures of successive motion indicate
231 Since Gould and Landreth rejected the application of the Howey test to stock
sales in the context of the sale of a business, this implies that the universal test for a
security will not be the three-part Howey test. See Gould, 105 S. Ct. 2308; Landreth,
105 S. Ct. 2297.
... See discussion of Marine Bank, 455 U.S. 551, supra text accompanying notes
197-201; discussion of Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
233 For a discussion explaining the terms "conjunctive" and "cluster," see supra note
66; infra text accompanying note 236.
'" I am employing the distinction between concept and conception introduced by R.
DWORKIN, supra note 76, at 134-36. Under this formulation, a legal "concept" gener-
ates various "conceptions." In interpreting the concept of property for purposes of the
due process clause of the Constitution, various forms of this concept may be manifested,
e.g., a teacher's right to tenure, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), an
interest in a driver's license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), or an interest in
welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The specific manifestations of
a concept are the rules and tests that may be drawn from particular cases. These con-
ceptions may be capable of delineation and articulation. On the other hand, the con-
cepts that create these manifestations may not be capable of delineation and articula-
tion. Moreover, the concepts that create these manifestations may not be capable of
simple articulation, especially if they are of a cluster form.
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movement.
In other words, the drafters of the provisions defining a security did
have something in mind.2"" The courts still have an obligation to search
for and adhere to this legislative intent. However, since the structure of
a security reveals itself to be cluster-like, it cannot be uncovered in a
single stroke. The deep structure of a cluster-like concept remains elu-
sive because a cluster-like concept cannot wholly be articulated by its
original drafter. It can be named or denoted by its paradigm or core
cases. But these are only examples of a concept that the drafter is strug-
gling to articulate.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Gould and Landreth strongly
suggest that the structure of a security is cluster-like and not conjunc-
tive. The term "conjunctive" refers to the traditional theory of meaning
that terms like "water" are described by attributes such as odorless,
colorless, and tasteless which conjunctively make up the essence of
water.23 6 Hence, a conjunctive description of security would be one
holding that security had attributes one, two, and three that must be
present in every case of a security. This would have been the case, for
example, had courts held that the Howey three-part test constituted the
three necessary and sufficient attributes of the term "security." In
Gould and Landreth, however, the court rejected this notion and held
that all stock, regardless of the economic circumstances of the transac-
tion, was a security. 2 7 Thus, the Howey test was rejected as the con-
junctive structure of all securities.
Since the Court probably will not hold that all notes are securities,
.28 As argued earlier, the definition of a security was made in an indexical manner.
The framers of the section could think of a few concrete examples that could "fix the
reference" of the term security, see supra text accompanying notes 156-59, such as
"stock" and "notes," but these were not meant to constitute the whole of the term. The
aspect of the term that the framers could not concretely describe is the second level
concept of a security. Because the framers had something in mind, this concept was not
left completely open for future interpreters to fill in without regard to the framers'
original intent. For instance, the framers included examples of what they meant (notes,
stock, etc.) and they intended the context of the transaction to influence whether a
security was found to exist. In a similar vein, imagine the problem of trying to commu-
nicate an idea for which one has no experience or reference. Suppose, for example,
trying to describe a pterodactyl if one had never seen such an animal, and had no name
for it. One might describe it as being "sort of like a large flying bat with very thin
wings having a wingspread of 20 feet." The incompleteness or vagueness of the descrip-
tion is no argument that the speaker did not have a referent in mind when she chose to
employ her description.
I See supra note 66.
187 See Gould, 105 S. Ct. 2308; Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297.
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the approach taken to stock will be fundamentally different from the
approach taken to notes. The structure of the concept of a security is a
cluster instead of a conjunction of attributes. The term "security" is
like the term "game": it has a cluster of properties defining it.
For example, it is held that we cannot define "game" by a conjunction
of properties such as having a winner and a loser, being entertaining, in-
volving the gaining and losing of points, because some perfectly acceptable
games lack some of these features. According to the cluster theory, some-
thing is a game because it has enough features from a cluster of properties
like these. A cluster theorist would claim that there need not be any prop-
erty in the cluster that is sufficient for the application of the term, but he
nevertheless holds that the cluster taken as a whole determines the exten-
sion of the term." 8
Thus, because it is impossible to reconcile stocks, notes, and investment
contracts in a conjunctive structure, the term "security" is of a cluster
rather than a conjunctive nature."3 9 If the description of a security is
cluster-like and never fixed in a conjunctive sense, the courts can never
meet the obligation to adhere to the original legislative concept of a
security.240 The remainder of this Article argues that for cluster struc-
tures in law, the winnowing process of adjudication based on outcome-
determinative factors is itself a means of adhering to original intent.
Two things must be kept in mind. First, the problem with faithful-
ness to original intent for cluster concepts results because the speaker in
such cases has a concept in mind but simply cannot articulate it. It is as
though she constantly says "you know what I mean . . ." The frus-
trated listener keeps offering examples hoping to ascertain what has
slipped the speaker's mind. The listener-questioner may come close, but
"I NAMING, NECESSITY, supra note 44, at 15.
"9 Thus, the cluster-like concept of a security may evolve to encompass all stock as a
security. Some notes will be a security and others will not, depending on factors such as
the nature of the relationship between parties and the degree of collateralization.
Profit-sharing relationships may be a security depending on whether the agreements
are negotiated on a one to one basis. All bonds and debentures may be considered a
security. Thus, each different category of instruments may involve a different combina-
tion of the features of a security. Accordingly, the concept is cluster-like.
340 The kind of cluster structure suggested supra note 239 indicates that the exist-
ence of a security may turn on a case by case approach in the instances of notes, profit-
sharing arrangements, investment contracts, and similar categories. Given that a secur-
ity could be found based on a wide variation of patterns, how is it that one could argue
that the courts are applying any kind of an "original concept" as opposed to making
one up as they go along? Part V of this Article argues that with cluster concepts, a
proper process of adjudication by asking the right questions is inherent in the original
concept. The original intent is one of the correct use of a process, not a particular
picture of structure.
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she is never exactly right. Although the speaker clearly has a concept in
mind, she cannot state it, but the listener-questioner still has a duty to
seek it out.
The second problem with the cluster concept in law is that the lis-
tener-questioner will keep guessing, but never will know if she's
right.24 1 While our forgetful speaker may concretely conceive of what
she was groping for, the continuous questioner in law will never actu-
ally know whether she has found the right concept. Thus, no one can
verify whether a particular cluster concept is an accurate description of
the original concept. Yet, one must avoid the reasoning that the lack of
verifiability removes the obligation to adhere to legislative intent." '
The best that one can do in the case of cluster concepts is to draw
nearer to a method of rational inquiry. Consider the following model,
suggested by the physicist John A. Wheeler in a different context,2 43 as
game-like versions of the common law process. These versions of the
popular game twenty questions are offered as a way of illustrating how
a process that asks the right questions generates successive conceptions
based on a single concept. Thus, the rationality of a process that pro-
duces different conceptions represents fidelity to original intent.
There is a game called "Botticelli." It is similar to the game twenty
questions except that instead of thinking of an animal, vegetable, or
mineral, the person who answers the questions (called here the "re-
spondent") thinks instead of a well-known person (dead or alive). Let
us imagine three different versions of Botticelli:
Version I -Basic Botticelli: The respondent thinks of a person and
the questioner has twenty questions to discern his or her identity. For
"I Cluster concepts like that of a security are attributive because the speaker uses
them meaningfully without concretely defining the terms. No single particular concep-
tion, as a specific manifestation, is a complete and accurate description of the driving
concept. By deliberately using terms attributively, the framers of such terms have ac-
ceded to the notion that no one particular conception could be correct. Thus, the lis-
tener-questioner will never know if she is correct because this is the nature of cluster
concepts, and because the framers intended this result. Since this lack of ultimate cer-
tainty is the logical intent behind the use of cluster concepts, the original intent is
satisfied by the properly framed search for, but failure ever to find, the original
concept.
"" Since the intent of the framers is that one will never find the correct original
concept in a simple conjunctive form, the obligation to adhere to original legislative
intent inheres in utilizing the correct process that will produce the desired conceptions.
In other words, there is no simple answer to the question "what is a security?" How-
ever, there is a correct process by which intended results will unfold.
143Wheeler, Law Without Law, in QUANTUM THEORY AND MEASUREMENT (J.
Wheeler & W. Zurek eds. 1983).
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example, supposing that the respondent chooses George Washington,
the questions may go as follows:
Question
1. Is he or she alive?
2. Is he or she American?
3. Is he or she male?
4. Was he a politician?
5. Was he from the West?
6. Was he from the South?
7. Was he a President?
-and so forth
Answer
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Thinking Of
(George Washington)
(George Washington)
(George Washington)
(George Washington)
(George Washington)
(George Washington)
(George Washington)
Version II - Moving Botticelli: The respondent initially thinks of
one person, but without letting the questioner know, changes the per-
son she is thinking of after each answer. However, each new person
chosen by the respondent must be consistent with all previous answers
given by the respondent. Assume our respondent starts again with
George Washington.
Question
1. Is he or she alive?
After this answer our
respondent chooses:
2. Is he or she American?
After this answer our
respondent chooses:
Who must fit the category:
non-alive and non-American
3. Is he or she male?
After which our
respondent chooses
among the set of non-alive,
non-American females
4. Was she a political figure?
After which our
respondent chooses
among the set of non-alive,
non-American female
politicians
5. Was she from France?
Answer Thinking Of
No (George Washington)
(Louis Pasteur)
(Madam Curie)
(Indira Ghandi)
(Queen Victoria)
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After which our
respondent chooses (Cleopatra)
among the set of non-alive,
non-American, non-French,
female politicians
-and so forth
Version III - Random Botticelli: In this game, without letting the
questioner know, the respondent will watch a large clock on a wall
behind the questioner. At the end of each question asked by the ques-
tioner, if the second hand of the clock is on an even number (12:00:00)
she will answer "yes," if on an odd number she will answer "no."
Question Answer Time
1. Is he or she alive? No 12:46:55
The questioner now is thinking of the
set of all dead persons
2. Is he or she American? Yes 12:47:46
The questioner now is thinking of the
set of all dead Americans
3. Is he or she male? Yes 12:48:40
The questioner now is thinking of the
set of all male, dead, Americans
4. Was he a political figure? No 12:49:43
The questioner thinks of a set of all
dead Americans other than political
figures
5. Was he a scientist? Yes 12:50:50
The questioner thinks of a set of all
dead American scientists
6. Was he a physicist? No 12:51:27
Set: dead American male non-physicist
scientists
7. Was he a chemist? Yes 12:52:08
Set: dead male American chemists
8. Did he win the Nobel Prize? No 12:53:00
-and so forth
The point is this: the questioner cannot determine whether version
one or version two is being played. Moreover, unless she manipulates
the questions, she cannot tell the difference between versions one, two,
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or three. Each version appears rational and the questioner has the same
sense of satisfaction (or lack of it) in each case. In each version, if the
questioner wins by guessing the proper identity, she will believe she
has found the true answer. In other words, she will feel that she
guessed the identity of the personality that the respondent hid from the
start. But if it was really version three being played, she did not win at
all because no truth or answer existed. However, even version three
appears rational to the questioner unless she suspects that this random
version is being played and tests for it by repeating a question and
receiving an inconsistent answer.
On the other hand, the questioner cannot in any way discern the
difference between versions one and two. The questioner wins in ver-
sion two the same way she wins in version one. Even as the set of
possible identities becomes narrower, the respondent always must con-
ceptualize an actual person, whom the questioner, by guessing cor-
rectly, can identify. In other words, suppose question six to our version
two had been "Was she Cleopatra?" Our respondent would reply
"yes" and our questioner, arriving at this question through logical de-
duction and process of elimination, would be quite happy. The issue for
the purpose of this Article is whether a subsequent conception like Cle-
opatra is a right answer. Even though it is not the original answer
because respondent started with George Washington, the response is
yes.
The difference between versions one and two is that the original an-
swer or preexisting target in version one is known beforehand and at
all times by the respondent in a conscious way. In version two, the
respondent has a pattern to which she is predisposed but not con-
sciously aware, and thus cannot articulate. The ultimate identity (Cle-
opatra) is there during the initial question because the respondent has a
predisposition towards certain answers and because the rules require
successive consistency. Thus, Cleopatra is there initially because when
the respondent starts the game she decides to include a set of personali-
ties that would include, among others, Cleopatra and George Washing-
ton. She may not consciously be thinking of Cleopatra and George
Washington, but they are there because her mind chooses to sort among
all the persons in the world in a way that includes them. Then, when
she chooses an answer to the first question ("dead or alive?") her mind
must sort among all persons in a way that again contains Cleopatra
and George Washington. Thus it is so after each question. Though she
may never actually visualize Cleopatra through the first five questions,
Cleopatra is like a distant figure in a crowd who is constantly asked to
step away from the crowd and join a smaller and smaller group. To the
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respondent, Cleopatra is a distant figure in the sense that although she
does not see Cleopatra distinctly, she is thinking of her in an uncon-
scious, unarticulated way each time she chooses to sort. In this way, we
say that Cleopatra was "there" at the beginning. In this sense the pro-
cess of narrowing in version two represents faithfulness to original
intent.
The combination of questions and answers generates the sorting clas-
sifications that produce Cleopatra. But questioner and respondent do
not act independently. Both must act rationally and consistently after
each question. Both are responsible for Cleopatra. Both start by visual-
izing a huge, faceless crowd, and by process of question and answer,
end up with the same individual. Version two is an analogy of how a
cluster concept can be unmasked by the judicial process' questions and
answers. The combination of the respondent's concept (to change each
successive conception so that it remains consistent with previous ques-
tions) and the questioner's concept (asking questions consistent with
previous answers) produces a unified concept that generates appropri-
ate answers to each question. From the questioner's point of view, one
cannot discern whether the concept is cluster-like (version two) or con-
junctive (version one).
Version two demonstrates that the obligation to adhere to original
intent can be met when the generating concept is attributive and clus-
ter-like instead of conjunctive and elemental. Just because no clear his-
tory of the concept of a security exists does not mean that no process
can reveal that concept. The key point is that the questioner (and even
the respondents in our judicial system, the judges, are questioners) has
no way to tell the difference between version one and version two.
To imitate the judicial process accurately, some corrections to ver-
sions one and two must be made. First, play the game with concepts,
not persons. 44 Thus, instead of a game of "I'm thinking of a person
244 In law, the analogy to the questions asked and answered in Botticelli ("is this
person an American?") are the issues presented and the judicial determinations in each
case. In the definition of a security, the issue present in each case concerns the concept
of a security. For example, one case may pose the issue, "Is a profit-sharing arrange-
ment between two families that is negotiated on a one-on-one basis a security?" Thus,
as opposed to Botticelli, in which the goal is to identify a person, the point in law is to
uncover a concept that may be simple and conjunctive or complex and cluster-like. The
process of uncovering the concept of a security, like that of uncovering the nature of the
nucleus of an atom, is much harder than identifying personalities for which we have a
preexisting agreement regarding their existence and characteristics. See also Dworkin,
"Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 166-69 (1982) (common law pro-
cess analogized to the writing of a chain novel by series of different authors).
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X," the game becomes "I'm thinking of a concept that generates right
answers to the definition of a security." Second, change the game so
that there is no respondent. The questioner is like the judge who must
frame the inquiry. The questioner must guess how the respondent, if
she existed, would answer. Like the long-gone original framers of the
concept of a security, the respondent becomes a necessary fiction of the
game. Hence, the questioner will never know whether she has the right
answer, and will be unable to discern the difference between versions
one and two. There is no reason to insist that the concept of a security
have a clearly definable, original structure for there to exist an obliga-
tion to adhere to legislative intent.
Each decision that has attempted to define "security" is a different
question in a never ending game of version two. Each question brings
the interpreter closer to the concept of a security. There is no reason to
assume that the process works solely on the premise of strict original-
ism. To the questioner and outside observers (and all of us, including
judges, are questioners or outside observers), version two (the unarticu-
lated original concept) presents a possibility equal to version one of
honing in on the proper concept.
Hence, there is no need to reduce the structure of a security to sim-
ple, conjunctive elements. A cluster approach is equally viable and
equally acceptable. The cluster concept can be uncovered or discovered
by a process of asking the right questions. Thus, the meaning of a clus-
ter concept such as a security is reflected in the whole line of cases,
which indicates that courts have striven to be consistent with previous
answers. The notion that there is a clearly delineated original concept
of a security that successive judges should "see" '46 can be discarded
'" By "strict originalism" it is meant that the concept of a security is simple and
elemental and was capable of clear articulation by the original framers. Thus, this
concept has always existed prior to every judicial decision that has sought to seek it out.
The premise of strict originalism is also based on the assumption that it is possible to
know when a judge has correctly found this original concept.
2'6 As stated supra note 245, one premise of strict originalism is that all legal con-
cepts are simple and elemental and exist at the time of the creation of the term to be
interpreted. Thus, the proper concept is available to be "seen" by a judge. This is
similar to the Blackstonian notion that the law is outside of the observing judge, and
that she merely must find the law to be applied. To the Blackstonian mind, the judge
did not make law, but instead found the proper law. The appropriate law preexisted
the judge's attempt to find it. See Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Over-
ruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1960) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
69T) (emphasis added): "The judge merely finds the preexisting law; he then merely
declares what he finds. A prior judicial decision is not the law itself but only evidence
of what the law is."
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with the similar Blackstonian notion that judges discover an objective
law that exists as a "brooding omnipresence"247 in the sky.
The judge's problem in uncovering a cluster concept is to ask the
right questions or to know how to sense the outcome-determinative fac-
tors. Put simply, the judge must be able to discern what facts are im-
portant. For example, in the case of a security, the kinds of facts that
may be significant include the number of investors, the kind or nature
of the investment, the sophistication and wealth of the investors, the
form of the investment, and the degree of investor control. In Botticelli,
the next question is generated by previous answers. Similarly, the judi-
cial process seeks out right questions in the same inductive fashion: by
hazarding a guess from previous answers and an overall understanding
of the structure and purpose of the appropriate legislation.
CONCLUSION
The term "security" as set forth in the securities acts was used in an
indexical manner, as if to fix a reference. The drafters of the term had
an original concept in mind but that concept could not then be fully
articulated. The drafters were able to fix the reference of security by
pointing to some of its common examples - stocks, notes, investment
contracts, and other instruments. But these instruments do not com-
pletely describe the term "security." Rather, as this Article proposes,
such instruments constitute the first level of a two-tiered analysis. If an
instrument is included in these categories, defined by reference to state
law, it meets the first test for inclusion. However, an instrument may
be excluded at the second level, the level delineated by the concept of a
security, if it does not meet the conceptual requirements for being a
security.
Context determines the second level concept of a security. If the
transaction involving an instrument does not justify the application of
the acts, then, as to this particular class of transactions, the instrument
is excluded from regulation. For example, a profit arrangement be-
tween two families may be an investment contract but it may also be
excluded because it was negotiated in a one-on-one fashion. Such trans-
actions do not justify the application of the securities acts.
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the structure of the
second level concept of a security is not a conjunction of attributes, but
rather a cluster of features. Some (but not all) of these features create
... See Levy, supra note 246, at 1, 2 (the phrase "brooding omnipresence" is that of
Chief Justice Holmes).
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the essence of a security. Moreover, different combinations of features
may give rise to a security in different contexts.
Although the structure of a security is cluster-like rather than con-
junctive, treating the concept of a security as completely open and al-
lowing courts to ignore the original, guiding legislative concept is un-
justified. Rather, cluster concepts can also exist in an unarticulated
form when the legislation was created. The judicial process that gener-
ates decisions from questions based on outcome-determinative facts un-
covers the cluster structure. Moreover, the process of formulating out-
come-determinative questions ensures fidelity to the original legislative
concept when the concept is both unarticulated yet existent at the time
of enaction.
The two-tiered test reconciles seemingly inconsistent approaches to
the definition of a security. It preserves consistency in treating all of the
categories, stocks, notes, bonds, and the like, as state-created instru-
ments. Moreover, recognizing that the second level may have a cluster
nature reconciles diverse treatment of stocks, notes, and other catego-
ries. In addition, the cluster approach adheres to a sort of modified
originalism, preserving the separation of powers between the courts and
legislature.
This Article has sketched broad outlines of the process of defining a
security. What remains is to delineate the cluster concept in more de-
tail. As in the case of Botticelli, the nature of the cluster concept makes
a case by case approach most suitable for eventually unmasking the
concept.
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